Funeral in Kobane, November 6, 2015. Demotix/ Soran Qurbani. All rights reserved.The threat of ISIL is too serious to be treated with a knee
jerk response like air strikes as the British Prime Minister suggests.
It is very difficult to understand why air strikes are the only option on the
table. Is it because they are the easiest way to show that we are ‘doing something’?
Have air strikes ever succeeded in militarily defeating an enemy without ground
operations and without a political strategy? Is it really the case that all other
policies have been tried and failed? The threat of
ISIL is too serious to be treated with a knee jerk response like air strikes.
The main argument made by David Cameron in favour of
airstrikes is that air strikes are having an effect in Iraq. He says that Iraqi
forces with the support of airstrikes have recaptured 30% of Iraqi territory
and halted the ISIL advance. He does not mention that ISIL has also advanced in
some places, for example, capturing Ramadi. However, even if we accept that
some gains have been made, the situation in Iraq is very different from Syria.
In Iraq, coalition forces are providing air support for ground operations
carried out by the Kurdish peshmerger, Shi’ia militias and the Iraqi army.
There is an Iraqi state that, despite its weakness, is involved in a process
that could increase its legitimacy albeit slow and weak. What is more, coalition
air strikes have been requested by the Iraqi government and this provides their
legal basis. What is more, coalition air strikes
have been requested by the Iraqi government and this provides their legal
basis.
None of these conditions pertain in Syria. It is true that
air support complemented the defence of Kobane by Syrian-Kurdish and Free
Syrian Army forces, but Kobane was razed to the ground so that the inhabitants
cannot return. At the same time ISIL has been expanding in Syria despite air
strikes; air strikes did not prevent the take over of Palmyra nor of parts of
Aleppo. Unlike Iraq, there are no other situations where ground operations
against ISIL are taking place. Even though the Prime Minister talks about 70,000
moderate opposition forces who could fight ISIL, in the absence of a political
solution they are more concerned with fighting the regime than ISIL. Mobilising
Syrian allies on the ground would only be possible in the context of a
political agreement, in which opposition armed groups operate alongside the
Syrian army under a new political inclusive leadership with the bases outlined
in the Geneva 1 communiqué.
And unlike Iraq, there is no legal basis for possible air
strikes. The current UN Resolution, despite what is being written in the press,
does not provide a legal basis for
the use of force. The current UN Resolution,
despite what is being written in the press, does not provide a legal basis for the use of force. Although it
includes the term ‘by all necessary means’ it does not specifically authorise
any use of force and it does not mention Chapter VII. David Cameron’s argument
for self-defence is yet another stretching of international law along similar
lines to President Bush in response to 9/11. Article 51 of the UN Charter,
which sets out the right to self-defence, was intended in the case of an armed
attack by a foreign state not in the case of an attack by non-state actors.
It is difficult to see what can be gained from air strikes. The skies above Syria are already congested. The contribution
that Britain would make, even if we suppose that air strikes are useful, is
marginal. Yet there is a lot to be lost by air strikes.
First of all, air strikes tend to be discussed in clinical
or surgical metaphors. The debate does not seem to take into account the fact
that air strikes are a form of terror. Even if they are very precise and there
is no collateral damage, air strikes are terrifying; they destroy buildings and
create fear. Even if targeting is precise, the intelligence on which targets
are located is prone to error so that innocent people are bound to be killed. The
Prime Minister says we should not undertake air strikes lightly – he is right,
we should think seriously about their consequences. We should not reply to
terror with terror unless we have very good arguments. Yet there is a lot to be lost by air strikes.
Secondly, we have no idea about the effects of terror on
radicalisation. The Prime Minister says we should strike at the heart of ISIL
in their Syrian capital, Raqqa, where these attacks are planned. But are they
not also planned in the suburbs of Paris and Brussels. Surely we would not
consider air strikes against terror suspects there? Military action transforms
terrorists into legitimate political enemies – they become martyrs not
criminals. Can
we be sure that air strikes will not play into the justifications of disaffected
young people from different parts of the world who might join this horrendous
version of the Salafi-Jihadist cause?
Thirdly, western air strikes have not enhanced the
reputation of the West among Syrian
public opinion. Members of Syrian civil society to whom we have talked do not
understand why the West is bombing ISIL and not doing anything to protect
civilians killed by the regime. And what they find even more troubling is the
failure of western air strikes so far to halt the advance of ISIL This failure has
already done great damage to their perceptions of the power of the West and
made them sceptical of its intentions.
So what is the
alternative?
So what is the alternative? As a starting point, we need
much greater understanding of the nature of ISIL and also Jabhat Al Nusra (JAN),
an Al Qaeda affiliate. Groups like ISIL and JAN thrive on conflict and
disorder. ISIL moves into areas where governance is weak and resistance is
virtually non-existent. It is unthinkable that organisations like ISIL and JAN could have expanded
into and within Syria had there not been a war in the country. Those Syrian
lands contested between government and opposition are the areas that are
falling into the hands of ISIL and JAN.
The most important thing Syrians lost because of the conflict is
simply their state, which is exactly what ISIL is attempting to provide by
reversing the process of state collapse. ISIL constructs state-like
structures establishing a monopoly of violence in the areas it controls and
providing services like healthcare and bakeries. The key to its success is that it plans
and acts like a state. The
key to ISIL’s success is that it plans and acts like a state. This explains why
movement into ISIL areas is greater than movement out. JAN is different, but it
is to be found in different places throughout the rebel held areas.
The war has also destroyed the local legitimate economy,
especially in opposition-controlled areas, and has led to the rise of an illicit
economy. The overall collapse of state control, the destruction of the formal
economy and the lack of governance of borders are providing ISIL and JAN with
opportunities to fund themselves from all kinds of illicit activities, such as
trading in looted antiquities,
extortion and ransom. Because ISIL controls supplies of oil, they have a
monopoly on the sale of oil to opposition areas, making them dependent on ISIL. At the same time, the extremely high levels of unemployment,
together with very high prices and the absence of other sources of income, has
left men of fighting age, who typically have to provide for their families, in
a very exposed position and vulnerable to recruitment by these organisations.
The main aim of any
strategy to counter ISIL must be legitimate state building. To reverse the process of state un-building
in Syria, the most important step is to end the conflict. Ending the conflict
requires serious commitment to an inclusive political solution that is
supported by regional and international consensus. Very strong emphasis also
needs to be put on restoring governance in opposition-controlled areas,
especially those most vulnerable to further ISIL expansion.
This includes reviving the
legitimate economy and introducing specific measures such as imposing much
stronger controls on the borders of ISIL areas with Turkey and Iraq, or
providing fuel for opposition-controlled areas in a legitimate way and at a
reasonable price and to make jobs available for men of fighting age to reduce
their vulnerability to combatant recruitment.
Surely, a better strategy
for Britain would be to focus on policies such as these that are not being
undertaken by others and, in which Britain could make use of its assets, such
as its long experience of providing aid
in conflict areas rather than joining a crowded and mistaken fashion for air
strikes.
In any case, it is only
within the framework of legitimate state building that any military involvement
might make sense.