U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson during a bilateral meeting with the Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah at Dar Salwa July 10, 2017 in Kuwait. Tillerson is meeting leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council in an attempt to end the isolation of fellow member Qatar by a Saudi led coalition. State Department/Zuma Press/PA Images. All rights reserved.The Qatari crisis is no passing issue in the strategic
alignment of forces in the Middle East with three main axes competing for
regional hegemony. The three main axes in the region, led by Iran, Saudi Arabia
and Turkey are likely to express their goals and interests differently, leading
to increased competition and dispute.
The main goal of each of the axes is the containment of
the others, including the more-or-less non-aligned states such as Iraq. If the Qatari crisis is not managed
rationally, then it is likely to compound the present risks in the regional
balance of power, with consequences for all states in the region.
The three axes
The first of these axes consists of Iran and Syria, as
well as non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen,
and forces affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq.
Iran is the main directing and controlling force in this axis, supported politically,
economically and militarily by the Russian Federation.
The second axis consists of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Yemen (under the leadership of Abed Rabbo
Mansour Hadi), in addition to some non-state actors such as Jaysh al-Islam (Islamic Front).
However, Saudi Arabia is the main force in this axis with Egypt as the second
pillar. Unlike the prior group, this axis is supported by the United States of
America.
The third axis is perhaps the most complex and most
embroiled by the recent crisis of diplomatic relations in the region; it is
composed of Turkey, Qatar and several non-state actors such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, Hamas, and various radical Takfiri salafist groups.
In a recent speech by Dr. Anwar
Gargash at Chatham House, the
UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs made the connection between Qatar and
the radical Takfiri salafist groups more clear: “The US State Department [has]
said openly in its 2015 country terrorism report that ‘entities and individuals
within Qatar’ had financed Al-Nusra,” a regional affiliate of Al-Qaeda. He
further noted that, “In Libya, Qatar has supported the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group and Ansar ashSharia. In fact, Qatar’s go-between with the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group is now-head of the Qatari special forces.”
Although Turkey is a major regional power, leadership in
its axis is rotated with Qatar as a result of a comparative advantage between
each country in different aspects of leadership; Turkey with its military-human
surplus is matched by Qatari finances to form the current integrated leadership
structure. This axis is similar in many ways to the Saudi Arabia-Egypt bloc, as
they are both supported by the United States and also part of the Sunni world
of Islam.
Criss-crossing alliances
Although each of the three main axes in the Middle East
have their own interests and goals, this has not stopped cooperation and
engagement across blocs on certain issues. Recent examples of reciprocity have occurred primarily
between the first axis (Iran) and the third (Turkey),
notably facilitated by the increasing engagement of Russia with both parties on
Middle East issues from Syria and the Kurds to economic relations.
The Iranian – Turkish rapprochement, in particular, has
figured prominently in many geopolitical issues yet to be resolved in the
region, such as the fight against terrorism,
the Kurdish Independence Referendum
– just recently both Turkey and Iran warned against such a vote, and
international efforts to ease the war in Syria.
As for the Iranian – Qatari rapprochement, recent
resolutions have covered interests from energy and military operations to
foodstuffs, the most important being the management and sharing of the world’s largest gas field.
Meanwhile, in the face of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) blockade that banned Qatari planes from their airspace, Iran opened its
maritime and airspace and also
supplied food to Qatar. In both instances, the Iranian-Qatari rapprochement has
had ramifications for the wider web of relations in the region.
The recent warming of relations between Turkey – Qatar and
Iran has highlighted the differences and contradictions between the goals of
these two axes and that of Saudi Arabia. Despite mutual American support and
common Islamic affiliation, both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have fundamentally
different visions and objectives towards Qatar and Iran.
United States' serious dilemma
The United States is particularly aware of the
consequences of an exacerbation of the conflict between its primary partners in
the region, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. American options are hamstrung in this
quarrel among allies.
To abandon Qatar in such a crisis would be damaging both
for the loss of an important pillar in the Middle East and the opportunity it
would provide to the Russians looking to reach warm waters. And the United States
is aware that Qatar, with the help of Russia, Turkey and Iran, is capable of
creating a gas monopoly with consequences for global economic growth.
The bigger picture here is that an exacerbation of an
inter-ally conflict could result in the disintegration of US-led alliance in
the region into two discrete groups, one of them being (the Muslim brotherhood)
with Qatari capital and Turkish manpower and the other (Wahhabi) with Saudi
capital and Egyptian manpower.
In the eyes of the US State Department, any threat to GCC
security is a threat to US national interest. Gulf security is a long standing
part of American national security since President Jimmy Carter, who outlined
in his 1980 State of the Union Address:
“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force.”
Given the US position, American policy planners are
watching the events in the Gulf anxiously, particularly as it relates to Iraq.
Managing the inter-ally Qatari crisis has therefore put
the United States in a serious dilemma, since strong action in favor of either
side must be weighed against repercussions for the 10,000 American personnel in
Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US military base in the Middle East.
Iraq geopolitics
Iraq is located in the middle of the three axes: Iran from
the east, Saudi Arabia from the south-west, and Turkey from the north. In the
face of competition and heated conflict between these axes, Iraq is in both a
position of weakness and strength, with both threats and opportunities in
consideration.
The recent destruction of the country is at odds with its
historic centrality to the region, making it both a prized possession and a
vulnerable partner to each axis. All three axes are looking for influence in
Iraq. And based on their collective geo-strategic perspectives, Iraq can
function as both a crucial client state and buffer zone.
In an interview with former Ambassador Alberto Fernandez,
President of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks at Broadcasting Board of Governors,
he outlined the needs of the Iraqi state in the near future.
“The key is to strengthen the institutional integrity and
efficiency of the Iraqi state, all of its institutions and its appeal to all of
its citizens. Strengthening Iraq as a government and as a society makes the
interference of hostile foreign powers more difficult.”
The reality is that there is a crucial window following
the liberation of Mosul to consolidate gains and tighten control over Iraq.
Competition for influence in Iraq threatens to carve the nation along
sectarian, ideological, and material lines. The fragile national unity faces
its greatest challenge if Saudi Arabia and Iran enter a zero sum game for
influence. The brunt of their proxy war is likely to fall squarely on Iraq and
its people.
The US is concerned that Iran will go on the political
offensive in Iraq. With the liberation of Mosul, Iran may well conclude that it
no longer benefits from any US presence in Iraq. Iran has a vast array of means to
exert pressure on the main Iraqi political decision makers, especially through
its non-state actors. In addition, Iran’s strategic and historical relations
with Shiite political forces gives it a foothold to direct the Iraqi people
towards its own bloc.
As for Saudi Arabia, the country has its own means of
keeping Iraq from aligning too closely with Iran. The kingdom could passively
refrain from supporting the reconstruction of the liberated areas, or actively
support groups and parties intent on destabilizing the peace and impeding the
political process in Iraq. More broadly, the Saudis may pressure other
countries of the Arab and Islamic world against providing support to Iraq.
Finally, Turkey also possesses the means of exerting
pressure in the Iraqi political arena. The Ataturk Dam on
the Euphrates River, one of the largest in the world, is owned by Turkey.
Last year The New York Times reported on a story, “Turkish Dam Project Threatens to Submerge
Thousands of Years of History,” that discussed the
near completion of several Turkish dam projects, in particular the Ilisu Dam. The
consequences for water levels in parts of Iraq appear to be significant, with
marshes drying and the agricultural industry as a whole declining. Using water
as a political card may play in Turkey’s favor with Iraq.
Similarly, Turkey may use the Kurdish issue and its bloc’s
ties with Massoud Barzani, President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, to its
advantage vis-a-vis Iraq. Barzani's demands for independence may be pushed by
both Qatar and Turkey. Although Turkey is opposed to Kurdish independence, this
doesn’t rule out Erdogan’s willingness to use the possibility to pressure the
Iraqi government.
Qatari money is also at play and has been spent on armed groups making
it possible for the country to stand up to any national reconciliation process
in Iraq or any project that may stand in the way of its interests. The US department of treasury
stated in 2014 that,
“Qatar – are soliciting donations to fund extremist
insurgents, not to meet legitimate humanitarian needs. The recipients of these
funds are often terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate,
al-Nusrah Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group
formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).”
In addition, Dr Anwar Gargash pointed out in a speech at
Chatham House that, “Just this year, the state of Qatar paid a ransom of
approximately $1 billion to free a group of Qatari falconers in southern Iraq.
Multiple sources confirmed to the Financial Times that $700 million
was paid to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and to the Shia militias which
they control,” evidencing once more Qatar’s willingness to fund extremist
groups in the region.
The Qatari crisis, and the broader diplomatic imbroglio it
has caused, has provided the impetus to the race for control of Iraq. Given the
geopolitical value of Iraq and the opening presented to the various blocs in
the region after the liberation of Mosul, competition for the future balance of
power in the Middle East is already underway between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey.