A poster at a demonstration against Egyptian President Mursi reads 'The Muslim Brotherhood are criminals, they stole the revolution, they destroyed the state, they traded us in, all in the name of religion' at Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, 28 June 2013. Matthias Tödt/DPA/PA Images. All rights reserved.The first
democratically elected president in Egyptian history, Mohamed Morsi, gives a televised speech on 2 July 2013. The country is buzzing with unrest. Hundreds
of thousands are demonstrating against the president, some estimates suggest
millions.
The president is
visibly nervous. The military gave him an ultimatum. Although some members of
the Muslim Brotherhood, of which the president is a member, were in denial, the
message from the military is clear: step down or we will force you to.
The unhinged and soon
to be ex-president is defiant in his frantic speech. His stance was reminiscent
of a deposed Tsar
on the brink of madness as he called for his supporters to rally and defend him,
even if it were to rip the country apart. Morsi refers to himself as the only
legitimate ruler, repeating the word legitimacy 56 times throughout his entire speech.
It becomes apparent
that demonstrators’ calls for an early presidential election will not be heeded.
The only way for him to step down is through force, something the military was
more than happy to ensure.
Following Morsi’s
speech, crowds of activists in the Borsah coffeehouse area of downtown Cairo unite in chanting one invocative phrase, kos ummak – a disrespectful insult
directed at Morsi.
The current
government has now shut down all these coffeehouses.
To this day, the
imprisoned ex-president and his supporters claim that he is the legitimate
president of Egypt; a claim that is wholeheartedly rejected by the current regime
who brand them as traitors, terrorists and conspirators.
But are anyone’s
claims to legitimacy true? I am not going into detail about the current
regime’s legitimacy claims; a regime that took power through the massacre of
over 1,150 Morsi supporters in what Human Rights Watch dubbed “one of the world’s largest killing of demonstrators in a single day in
recent history.”
This is a regime
that carried out tens of thousands of arrests, forced disappearances and even point-blank executions against any voice of dissent, under the cover of a pseudo war on terror
that only serves to fan the flames of terrorism.
This is a regime
that targets any person or party that poses a threat to their grip on power, be
it Islamists, leftists, revolutionaries or otherwise.
Many regimes look good by comparison, but should Egyptians be forced to compare?
It is without doubt
that part of the public’s anger towards the Morsi regime was sparked through a conspiracy orchestrated by the people that overthrew him. The Tamarod movement called
for Morsi to be deposed and allegedly collected 22 million signatures; it
turned out that they were backed by the military and powerful old regime
figures.
There is no doubt,
however, that the public’s outrage was not a product of this conspiracy alone. The Muslim
Brotherhood was desperate for power, and they went back on their word every
single time they were presented with an opportunity.
After the revolution, they had claimed
that they would only run for 30 percent of the seats in parliament. However, when the time came, they ran for all available seats.
They promised they
would not run for the presidential elections, and forced one of their ranking
members (Abou El Fotouh) to resign, cutting ties with him because he had
announced that he was going to run for presidency. But then, they reneged on their
promise and nominated a primary candidate as well as a backup, who happened to
be Mohamed Morsi.
Morsi became the first democratically elected president in Egyptian history. He won by a very
thin margin – a little over half of the vote – in the run-off presidential
elections. With the consolidation of most of the Islamist and revolutionary
votes, 13 million people voted against Morsi and for the candidate of the old
regime, Ahmed Shafiq; a fact that the Muslim Brotherhood conveniently chose to
ignore.
Talks of unity with
all the revolutionary forces in the country, most of who only bitterly voted for the Islamists to prevent Mubarak’s regime from returning, quickly
faded. The Brotherhood, which arguably sought power since its formation in 1928,
called for talks with different factions but then completely ignored them, flaming
rising sectarian tension and hate speech. The Islamists clearly felt emboldened
by their newfound power.
In the meantime, the
situation was not improving in the country. The media found an unprecedented
level of freedom in the aftermath of the revolution and didn’t hold back in
their criticism of Morsi’s regime. Some were valid independent voices and others
were driven by the deep state, but most fell somewhere in between.
The Brotherhood was
not happy and talked of censoring media outlets. Death threats were even put forth by some of the Islamists
supporting Morsi. There was a sit-in and a blockade around Egypt’s media city to stop certain shows from airing.
Without any real
reform, continuous praise and pay raises were made by Morsi to the same
police force that hunted and persecuted his group for over 80 years. The regime
thought they could utilize Mubarak’s oppressive arm to enforce their own brand
of oppression. They were wrong.
One of the breaking
points was the constitution that was passed under Morsi. After initial talks and the
founding of a constitutional committee, non-Islamist members walked out when it
became clear that some of the articles the Brotherhood insisted on passing aimed
to create a backbone for theocracy. Little to no
effort was made to reach a consensus, as later explained by Wael Ghonim, the well-known revolutionary figure. After losing their
revolutionary allies, the Islamists were on their own.
Even with the
constitution, Morsi chose to destroy the legal foundation for his power – his
“legitimacy”. The president announced a constitutional declaration establishing himself as a dictator. He removed
the general prosecutor from office – something the president does not have the
power to do. He used Brotherhood militia against anti-regime demonstrators near
the presidential palace, which resulted in bloody clashes after the police turned a deaf ear to his
calls to disperse the demonstrations.
The president might
have started off as a democratically elected ruler, but at this point, he no
longer was.
No one can claim
legitimacy in post 30 June 2013 Egypt. Both the current and previous regimes
want Egyptians to believe in the binary: us versus them. Choosing between sets
of totalitarianism and different brands of dictatorship: Morsi’s that veered
away from democracy toward authoritarianism, and Sisi’s
that was born or rather, resurrected, as a continuation of Mubarak’s regime.
There are no
prepackaged democracy bundles or established players in the Egyptian political
landscape that offer a path towards a legitimate democracy. The people need to
accept that they have to forge it on their own, which at this point in Egyptian
history will most likely come at a bloody price.