People Iran's President Hassan Rouhani's speech at a teahouse in central Tehran on May 8, 2018. Picture by Ahmad Halabisaz/Xinhua News Agency/PA Image. All rights reserved.
“Those
who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it” George
Santayana
In
face of unprecedented US hostility buoyed by a host of regional
adversaries like Saudi Arabia and Israel, the ruling establishment in
Tehran needs to tread cautiously
if it is to manage what is potentially the greatest existential
threat it has faced since its inception in 1979.
The
choices before them are simple: continue as before and risk greater
economic hardship, more internal unrest and possible military
conflict; or provide instead through dialogue and engagement, real
possibilities for economic recovery and a final end to Iran’s
international isolation.
In
a difficult ride that has endured one crisis after another, the
Islamic republic has successfully managed not just to retain total
control at home but to extend its influence as a powerful regional
player. Yet, its economy is in tatters and the gulf between ordinary
people and the regime in general and its hardline ideologues in
particular has seriously widened with the passage of time.
Following
President Trump’s announcement to withdraw from JCPOA and to
reinstate previously removed sanctions, earlier promises to revive
Iran’s ailing economy by creating jobs, curtailing inflation,
salvaging the national currency and promoting over all prosperity by
resolving the ‘nuclear dispute’ seems little more than a fading
mirage.
Although
the European signatories of JCPOA along with Russia and China have
remained faithful to their commitments so long as Iran remains
compliant to its obligations, the reality is that the scale of
investments and technology transfers needed by Iran is simply beyond
their grasp in face of persistent US opposition. The French
president, Emanuel Macron, has been quite succinct in pointing out
the reality that no European government can force any major private
entity to risk jeopardizing its US operations for the sake of doing
business with Iran.
The
situation was further exacerbated when Mike Pompeo sent a 12-point
‘set of demands’ to the Iranian leadership – telling them amongst
other things to
give up Iran’s ballistic missile program, end all enrichment
activities and cease involvement in every regional country it is
currently involved in. Expectedly, his message was immediately
rebuked by Ayatollah Khamenei and countered by Iran’s own ’15
point demand list’ as later announced by the Iranian foreign
minister, Javad Zarif.
Yet
somehow, irrespective of the current toxic atmosphere, the
possibility for a potential ‘new deal’ with Iran has deliberately
not been blocked by no lesser figure than president Trump himself.
This was made abundantly clear in the tail end of his speech removing
the US from JCPOA and repeated in more precise terms during the
course of his press conference with the visiting Japanese prime
minister in early June. This flexibility suggests that much like his
earlier hard rhetoric against North Korea, the US President in
concert with a responsive Iranian leadership could be a willing
partner to once again confound everyone by squaring the circle.
Such
a supposition would suggest that any initiative for exploiting
possibilities for a more comprehensive ‘deal’ capable of meeting
Iran’s broader expectations must now come from the Iranian
leadership. Anticipating the urgent nature of this matter, some 100
well known Iranian political and social activists have signed an open
letter demanding that direct negotiations with the US should now be
actively pursued. While this call has been strongly rejected by
hardline quarters close to Ayatollah Khamenei, the spirit of their
message has received a positive response from a number of senior
advisers close to president Rouhani.
Responding
to this challenge while strategically strong in the region, is an
obvious advantage for Iran’s bargaining position in what one
Iranian journalist has dubbed as the ongoing “public negotiations’
following the ‘maximalist positions’ that have been advanced by
both Pompeo and Zarif. The alternative, in the event of added
altercations leading to further diplomatic discord and possibly
military confrontation with the US, would in all probability weaken
Iran’s bargaining position and play more directly into the hands of
its regional competitors such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Such an
outcome in concert with continuing domestic protests, could lead to
seriously detrimental consequences not just for the ruling
establishment but also for the country.
Responding
to this challenge while strategically strong in the region, is an
obvious advantage for Iran’s bargaining position
The
Iranian leadership has never been in a better position – i.e. given
the existing level of international irritation with the Trump
administration – for advancing its arguments for a more comprehensive
new deal following America’s withdrawal from JCPOA. It is ironical
that Iran stands to potentially gain a great deal more than an
alternative scenario that would have had the US in the agreement but
still obstructing the resumption of normal economic ties between Iran
and the rest of the world.
It
is now incumbent on Ayatollah Khamenei in particular to respond in
support of Iranian national interest by not obstructing the start of
direct Iran-US talks with the clear purpose of reaching a durable
agreement that no longer leaves Iran reliant upon partners incapable
of meeting its crucial economic needs. While president Rouhani’s
pragmatic government might be amenable to such an outreach, it is
those self-serving quarters associated with Khamenei who grudgingly
continue to label any rapprochement with the US as a betrayal of the
Islamic Revolution.
The
hard-liners conveniently forget that while serving as president,
Khamenei never opposed either repeated purchases of military
equipment from Israel during the Iran-Iraq war nor the invitation
that was extended to Robert McFarlane to visit Iran in what later
became infamously known as the ‘Iran Gate’ scandal. At the time,
pragmatism, not ideology was at the forefront of Khamenei’s
consideration, much like the flexibility he later displayed over the
nuclear issue when he allowed the Rouhani team to strike the JCPOA
deal with the ‘5+1’.
Obstinate
rigidity on the part of Khamenei in current circumstances can prove
lethal both at home and abroad, while direct dialogue with the US can
potentially lead to a situation that might avert economic
uncertainties, domestic instability , external humiliation and
regional chaos.
While
Iran – just as the US – will undoubtedly have to make some
concessions for reaching a durable compromise– similar to those
made by countries like China, Vietnam and Cuba, each with their own
past history of hostility with the US, the gains it can make are
significant and well capable of bringing to realization the ambitious
hopes of many patriotic Iranians for the future of their country.
Iranian
leaders need to appreciate that for the foreseeable future, Europe,
China and Russia are incapable of circumventing the US in meeting
Iran’s urgent needs. Moreover, they need to realize that either
buying time or becoming reliant on countries like China and Russia
simply for purposes of counterbalancing the US, quite apart from its
limitations, is hardly in the long-term interests of the Iranian
people.
Mr.
Khamenei, in light of America’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal,
may be permitted to take some solace in having previously warned
against “not trusting the Americans”, but it is a fact that as
matters develop, only he will be held responsible for any harm that
should befall upon the Iranian nation as a consequence of his
intransigence in allowing for new talks.