1987 poster of the political wing of ETA, Batasuna.Extreme,
populist and anti-systemic parties are on the rise! Only this year elections in
the Netherlands and Bulgaria and Germany returned excellent results for radical
right parties (e.g. Party of Freedom,
Alternative for Germany or Ataka). Even in usually quiet
Liechtenstein The Independents (DU),
a right-wing populist party, managed to obtain more than 18 percent of the
votes. In France, Marine Le Pen came second in the presidential elections. Last
Sunday the Freedom Party of Austria got more than 20 percent of the vote, and
in countries like Greece or Slovakia support for neo-Nazi parties (i.e. Golden Dawn or People’s Party Our Slovakia) reach a notable 7 percent of the
electorate.
We
learn from the “Who Governs Europe” project, that the average percentage
of votes for anti-establishment (both right and left) parties in 20 western
European consolidated democracies stands currently at 24.2, when less than fifty
years ago it was 13.2 percent. Indeed, the success of populist/anti-systemic
parties so far this decade almost doubles the average percentage of votes
obtained at the height of the inter-war period (14.3 in the 1930s).
Even
if we were to disregard this trend in the levels of electoral support for those
parties, the pattern is clear: almost 50 percent of the elections in western
Europe with a record high polarization since 1900 have taken place in the last
15 years, the other 50 percent spreads across the 10 preceding decades. Given
these general trends/patterns, and notwithstanding important nuances, scholars and practitioners alike seem to agree on the
“threat” these types of parties pose for liberal democracy.
How then
do we deal with those fringe anti-systemic parties? Should we allow them to
undermine our democratic regimes from within, or should we ban them? What are
the consequences for the development of party politics? This is the question we
addressed in our last article in the European Journal of Political Research. There we looked at the
effects of banning parties, but also the consequences of the failure to ban, in
various political systems both at the national (Germany and Turkey) and the
regional level (the Saarland, Lower Saxony and Saxony in Germany as well as the
Basque Country and Navarre in Spain). This is what we found.
Volatility, fragmentation and closure
First
of all, we can say that the banning of a political party will increase
electoral instability as its previous supporters will have to choose between
either abstaining in the next elections or finding a new party representing
their particular interests. In other words, party bans ‘force’ voters to choose
a marriage of convenience with another party close to their ideological
preferences, if they do not want to either waste their vote or be left out of
the political process.
Secondly,
the judicial dissolution of a salient party is to a party system like the removal
of an organ in the body or the slaughter of a species in an ecosystem: the
system may continue working, but its constituent characteristics/ mechanisms are
altered forever. This is because as Giovanni Sartori clearly explained some 40 years ago, the number of parties
determines the mechanisms of a party system and, any alteration to the format
of the party system will have consequences on the way party politics evolve.
Thirdly,
the prohibition of a party also has important consequences for the process of a
government formation, as the
disappearance of a party with ‘coalition potential’ affects the way political
parties interact/compete, not only because it destroys previous practices among
the political parties in the system, either in terms of collaboration (e.g.
Turkey) or discrimination (e.g. Spain), but also because it artificially alters
the distribution of political parties, forcing parties to search for new
political partners, new dimensions of competition, or both.
Stability vs. representation
These three effects taken
together, however, show that while party bans do alter the party system,
in the longrun the removal of the “anti-systemic” element helps to stabilize
the party system, despite costs in terms of political representation and
democratic legitimization. The latter was visible in the Basque Country, where
the prohibition of ETA’s “political arm” (i.e. Batasuna) was followed by an
increase in the percentage of spoiled ballots by more than 8 points.
It is not only banning parties
that might have negative consequences. The legalization of previously banned
parties (e.g. Batasuna in the Basque Country) or the “failure to ban” a party
(e.g. NPD in Saxony) might also increase electoral uncertainty, change the
format of a party system (e.g. from hegemonic to competitive) or oblige parties
to alter their patterns of government formation by forcing them to forge
unnatural (conservatives and socialists in Navarre) or “great” coalitions (e.g.
socialists and Christian-democrats in Saxony).
Size does matter
All
the abovementioned effects take place only if the banned party is relevant
within the party system. Needless to say, it is different if the judicially
dissolved party gets less than 1 percent of the votes or if it is one of the
top-3 parties in the system. Thus, while the banning of the National Democratic
Party (NDP) in Austria in 1988 did not significantly alter the country’s
over-institutionalized party system, the prohibition of the German Communist
Party (KPD) certainly did.
All in all, decisions
about the proscription of relevant parties may have fundamental implications
for electoral stability, systemic fragmentation and government formation. Such
questions remain important as to whether it is more appropriate to ban a party or
deal with anti-democratic attitudes through political debate or civic education;
or whether to deal with offensive or violent behavior through the criminal
justice system. However, public debate should additionally address the question
of whether banning a party might affect the stability of political choice and its
implications for government closure.
The next time someone
intends to launch a party ban case in the courts, it might also be appropriate
to consider whether the artificial constraints of a cordon sanitaire and
consequent ‘uncomfortable’ or ‘undesirable’ government formations is a better
outcome for democratic politics than a party ban.