Mohamed El-Shahed/AFP/Getty Images. All rights reserved.Over the past few months, news of repression coming out of Egypt has
witnessed a qualitative shift: it has been worsening.
First, there was the murder of the Italian PhD scholar, Giulio Regeni, who was
conducting field research on independent trade unions in Egypt. His battered body
was found dumped on the outskirts of Cairo, showing signs of “inhuman,
animal like” violence. Even though there is no hard evidence, accusations
have been pointing at the Egyptian police, who had supposedly apprehended
Regeni shortly before his death.
This was followed by the murder of a tuk-tuk driver by an ameen shorta, a lower-ranking police official, over an argument about
the fare in the lower-class area of Al Darb Al Ahmar. The driver was shot in
the head then and there, which prompted the crowds to attack the ameen shorta and march in angry protest to
surround the police station.
This was followed by similar attacks on doctors in Matareya Hospital by the same rank of police officials. This was due to the doctors' refusal to forge a medical report.
This event triggered a partial doctor’s strike in protest, and it is the first incident where a
professional syndicate – previously dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood – takes
an open position against Egypt’s current military regime.
This series of events was reflected in popular discourse with the appearance
of the phrase “mafeesh Hatem beyethakem”, to mean “no ameen shorta
(policeman) stands trial”, reflecting the impunity with which these petty
security officials operate, which is indicative of the state of the Egyptian
polity.
This qualitative shift in repression can be attributed to three factors:
the worsening political and economic situation of the country; the decentralization
of repression; and the change in the ministry of interior’s role under Sisi.
All of these factors are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.
Egypt has been experiencing a severe economic crisis that has intensified
over the past few months. It is clearly reflected in the rapid devaluation of
the Egyptian pound and the shortage in the supply of hard currency, which is creating
major issues for industry.
This can be attributed to the collapse of revenues in several vital
sectors. First, the collapse of the tourism industry after the attack that
downed the Russian air jet killing over 200 Russian tourists. Many hotels in
the Red Sea are reporting minimal occupancy rates, with some of them even closing
down as they can no longer bear the operating costs. This dried up Egypt’s most
important source of foreign currency.
Second, the reduction in revenues from the Suez Canal, which was recently
expanded at a cost of eight billion dollars; a project mainly executed by the
military. The lower price of oil has been causing ships to by-pass the canal, going around the cape of Good Hope at higher speeds and lower costs. Besides the apparent
loss of eight billion dollars, if this trend continues the revenues from the
Canal are only set to decrease further.
Finally: the reduction of remittances from Egyptians abroad. This
provided a steady stream of hard currency, but it decreased with the
collapse of the price of oil because a large number of Egyptian workers are
concentrated in the oil producing Gulf. This created a crisis in which the
Egyptian pound has been subject to a series of devaluations, and the dollar
has been in short supply.
The regime has unleashed a wave of repression that it can no longer control.
The crisis is so strong that some manufacturing companies have suspended
their operations, due to the lack of hard currency. This will also drive up
inflation, since Egypt imports many basic foodstuffs (Egypt is the largest
wheat importer in the world), which will hit the lower and middle classes very
hard. The pinch is even being felt by the upper classes, as the
currency crisis is starting to affect their luxurious consumer habits.
In the midst of this crisis, Sisi’s motorcade is seen driving over a
four-kilometre-long red carpet that is reported to cost over a million pounds, while at the same time indicating the government’s
intention to remove subsides for drinking water.
This sense of crisis was reflected in the latest and longest speech given by Sisi, when he announced his development
plan for 2030. In a scene reminiscent of the Arab dictators' ‘king of comedy’, Colonel
Gaddafi, when he asked his detractors “who are you,” Sisi asked the people of
Egypt to “listen only to me” and then offered to sell himself to raise money
for the country. An activist responded by placing him for sale on eBay
under the title of “slightly used dictator”; the page has now been removed.
This economic crisis has repercussions on the level and nature of
repression experienced by the Egyptian polity. As the failures of the regime
become more apparent, the promises of prosperity are evaporating and its
popularity is eroding. The regime is starting to rely more and more on
repression, ceding more power to the petty agents of this repression as they
commit the regime’s crimes. Thus, a process of the decentralisation of
repression is taking place, where the petty agents of repression are given the
green light to act as they see fit. Repression is no longer being directed from
the center, on the contrary, it is being directed from the periphery as power is
becoming diffused.
This makes the repression random and unpredictable, lacking its own coherent logic. Previous 'red lines', as under the Mubarak regime, are disappearing and not being
replaced. The clearest example is the murder of Regeni, a European
citizen. This would have been inconceivable under the Mubarak regime,
especially since he could have easily been deported.
The decentralisation of power also allows petty security officials
increased powers in policing their own local communities, as they become the
eyes and ears of the regime. Thus, the regime overlooks cases of corruption and
extortion, where these security officials turn their local communities into
fiefdoms. In some cases, their power is more pervasive than senior officers who
have no connection to local communities, as they rotate from one station to the
other.
Accordingly, the use of excess force by petty security officials should
not come as a surprise. They have become accustomed to violence and repression
as daily tools to deal with local citizens. As the regime relies increasingly
on repression, the power of the interior ministry – as the coercion apparatus
mainly responsible for internal repression – also increases. As such, the
regime becomes less likely to attempt to rein in these petty security officials
as they are on the front lines carrying out the acts of repression.
The Egyptian polity is currently stuck in a reinforcing loop of
militarisation and repression, which seems to be set to increase over the
coming years. Some might have hoped, including myself, that the first wave of
repression would subside, allowing for the re-establishment of a logical pattern
of repression that citizens can navigate through. However, this has not
occurred.
Repression is now more random and illogical, and thus more dangerous than
it was before. This is exemplified in the phenomenon of forced disappearances, which has now reached hundreds of cases, with many ordinary citizens disappearing as well
as the lawyer who was representing the disappeared.
The regime has unleashed a wave of repression that it can no longer
control. Power now lies in the hands of those that police local communities: Egypt’s
new untouchables, the petty security officials.