Alexis Tsipras, February 2015. Demotix/indiPHOTOpress. All rights reserved.Does the unjust and forced ‘agreement’
between the Greek government (now facing the task of ratifying the agreement in
the Vouli) and the other states in the European Union (not all of whom feel the
necessity for such a sanction) mark the end of one era and the beginning of
another? In many ways yes, but almost certainly not in the sense indicated to
us by the 'Summit' report. In reality, the agreement is fundamentally
unenforceable in economic, social and political terms, though it will be
‘forced through’ by a process that promises to be at least as brutal and even
more divisive than the extremities we have seen over the last 5 years.
It is therefore necessary to try to
understand the implications of the agreement and to discuss its consequences,
avoiding all use of rhetoric but not of engagement or passion.
In order to do so we must first look at how
the negotiations unfolded (those opened by Alexis Tsipras’s return to Brussels
on the back of his ‘triumph’ in the July 5 referendum – which, for good reason,
has not ceased to fuel incomprehension and criticism among his supporters in Greece
and abroad), and secondly we must look at what these negotiations tell us about
the positioning of the various European forces.
We must define the stage that the crisis in
the EU has reached (a crisis of which Greece is both the symptom and the victim)
in terms of three strategic domains: firstly the debt situation and the
effects of the austerity measures; secondly the division of Europe into unequal
zones of prosperity and sovereignty; and finally the
collapse of democratic systems and the resulting rise in populist nationalism.
But first, it is vital that we include an ‘assessment’
of the Brussels agreement: ‘as seen from Athens’ (from the Greek people’s point
of view) and ‘as seen from Europe’ (which does not mean as seen from Brussels, whose institutions clearly have no
awareness whatsoever of the current European climate).
The
‘agreement’ from the Greek perspective
Seen from Greece, the agreement seems to be
well and truly like a diktat.
Varoufakis went so far as to mention ‘Versailles’, a provocative allusion to
the 1918 treaties which had the well known repercussions for German history and
for the fate of the world. The accusation was sufficiently serious and credible
for Merkel to state immediately that she is unconcerned with ‘historical
comparisons’… This dramatized illustration is justified for two closely linked reasons.
The first is this: even though Tsipras’s July 7 proposals in Brussels constituted a large
concession on his part (accepting, in the main, the proposals of budgetary and
economic austerity that he had previously refused, in particular those concerning
retirement and taxation), they were nevertheless integrated into a Greek
government project (so as not to say
a ‘plan’) of adjusting Greece’s economy and finances, whereby, under conditions
that would have certainly been more difficult than desirable, he could have
hoped to develop his own political strategy in the interests of his
people. Incidentally, this is why Tsipras
went along with the repeated demands for an adjustment of the debt (demands increasingly
supported by renowned economists with very different orientations – both from the IMF and independent of it).
Under repeated pressure from the German
minister for finance and the president of the Eurogroup speaking in his name, it is precisely
this last attempt at rationality and coherence that Greece’s interlocutors
immediately set about destroying, talking of their ‘loss of trust’ in the Greek
government (a purely moral argument) and imposing punitive measures
without any economic rationale.
The result has been an anti-plan of improvement that resembles bleeding the Greek
population’s remaining resources (notably the resources of the poorest strata
of society, those who are already right up against humanitarian catastrophe) and
carving up the national economy in preparation for completely unpredictable
‘ideological’ privatizations. In this respect, measures like raising the
retirement age are particularly significant – absurd if not criminal in an
economy where youth unemployment is almost 60% – not withstanding the
preventive ‘seizure’ of Greek assets that is reminiscent of a usurer taking guarantees (even if Tsipras, in an extremely difficult situation,
managed to avoid the establishment of a local version of the Treuhandanstalt in Luxembourg, in an
establishment which… is also headed up by Schauble!).
Europe conducts itself with respect to
Greece in this instance, both as a usurer and as a predator, the
objective not being to maintain the viability or growth of its resources, but
instead to drain them until exhaustion. Whatever
this anti-politics may be – rationalized in the eyes of some (perhaps in good
faith) by the dogmas of a monetarist orthodoxy inscribed in ‘golden letters’ in
the European treaties that have been signed since Maastricht, and reinforced by
the ‘budgetary pact’ of 2012 – it clearly does not constitute any sort of
justification since we are no longer at the beginning of the
crisis, and all the European leaders (including the German ones) have observed
the enactment of the regressive effects of the policies that they have imposed at their leisure.
They know very well that Greece’s national
debt, having doubled in 10 years, has not reached 180% of GDP because of its absolute growth (comfortably outdone, even in proportion to population, by other
European countries), but instead as a result of the collapse of production and
consumption. Therefore, it is not a question of rationality, nor of the
creditors’ interests, but of political vengeance and the humiliation of an
‘interior enemy’. This is confirmed when we see that each measure that has been
imposed corresponds exactly to a reversal of social or economic
politics that Tsipras’ government was engaged in during its electoral programme
and when it took office.
We must now move on to the second reason
which allows us to talk of a diktat;
perhaps an even more serious one and in any case a motive that is destined to seal the former: the measures of ‘trusteeship’ that create a protectorate within the EU and that are
based on the model of ancient colonial practices but applied this time to one
of its members (whom we demand thereafter to be symbolically ‘co-responsible’).
Undoubtedly the most blatant measure regards the sovereignty of parliament; the
obligation to submit economically and socially sensitive draft legislation to the
control and authorization of ‘institutions’, notwithstanding of course a ‘verification’ by these same institutions – the result of which will allow the release of European loans. To illustrate the functioning of this mechanism: the
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ has already imposed a series of predetermined legislative
acts without delay (preliminary to the implementation of the agreement),
cancelling existing legislation and replacing it. Together, the acts represent a programme of
extreme neo-liberal transformation (without equal in modern Europe) of the
right to work and of administration (which is not lacking in irony when we note
that one of the principles is actually supposed to be the ‘depoliticisation of
administration’!).
We have also noticed the demand for the
‘independence’ of statistical tools (arising after the Greek authorities’
carried out an ‘audit’ of their debt and its legitimacy), a demand guaranteed
by the Troika experts’ return to Athens (whose level of personal independence
is indeed beyond suspicion). Finally, it must be mentioned that the necessity for a governmental
reshuffle (meaning the entry of anti-Syriza parties and the expulsion of the
‘radicals’) is a foregone conclusion in the corridors of the Brussels
Commission. Materially, this means
that the austerity measures and the trusteeship reinforce one another as
policies, so that Greece is no longer a sovereign nation (in any sense since this process started
years ago and was only halted by Syriza’s rise to power).
Unfortunately what this means is not that Greece is
entering into a shared sovereignty –
judicially equal and politically organized as would imply a progression towards
European federalism – but instead that it is bowing to the will of the master.
Which ‘Master’, however, are we talking about? It is at this point that we must
look at the other side of the coin: the European Union.
Europe’s
new constitution
We must do so by looking again at the facts and their historical
significance, but also more deeply, by defining the material
constitution presiding over modern Europe: the division of powers; the
institutional shifts resulting from the Treaties and from the enactment of the
treaties; the relationships between economic and political (and geo-political)
forces; the hierarchy of interests codified by ‘rules’ and ‘principles’ for
which states and their populations are forced to bend over backwards; the
decision procedures (or as we say nowadays, the ‘governance’ procedures); the
inequality of access to real power for different social and national groups and
the impossibility of influencing it, etc. In short, we must ask
ourselves what sort of ‘regime’ is modern Europe under?
Let us not revisit entirely what should already have become obvious,
that is to say the institutionalization of neo-liberalism since the 1990
milestone that came in the form of the dogma of ‘free and fair competition’
whose ‘revolutionary transformative’ effects can be seen across society today –
the EU’s equivalent of the Soviet Union’s state socialism.
If only to remind us that the belt is now tightened: neoliberal
‘liberty’ is essentially coercive. It involves – wherever ‘deviations’
or ‘failures’ are identified (essentially among the ‘debtors’ and the ‘weak’) –
incessantly forcing citizens to be free (as Rousseau – who
would never have imagined this sinister use of his formula – would have said).
Clearly, the degree of coercion varies enormously depending on one’s position
on the scale of real power. But more precisely: when the Greek and
Italian governments were replaced by a constitutional manipulation (2011) and
the preceding Greek referendum prohibited, the ‘revolution from the top down’ –
which was set up at the beginning of the public budgets crisis and the
arbitration in favour of the banks – was thenceforth a ‘fait accompli’. Habermas talked of postdemokratischer Exekutiv-föderalismus, a
highly enlightening concept.
But this ‘post-democratic executive’ that has taken effect on the
(quasi) federal tier – because the federalism being built in Europe on
extraordinarily fragile foundations comes entirely from the top – has the
remarkable property of being only partially visible and institutionally legitimate. To a great extent, it remains occult and informal, which is clearly illustrated by the
fact that the ‘European Commission’ no longer has the power of political
initiative, nor of mediating the interests of the member states. Jean-Claude
Juncker (president of the European Commission), threw in the towel – having
already had to resign himself to a humiliating recoil a few weeks ago – after a
crucial question over the future of Europe arose regarding the hosting of
refugees and the solidarity between states before the humanitarian catastrophe
in the Mediterranean. The Commission, being now no more than a (proliferating)
regulatory structure and a transmission belt, lost the power of negotiation to
the Eurogroup: a group established by no treaty and following no
rule, whose internally elected president then serves as a spokesperson for the
most powerful and most influential of the member states – Germany, in other
words.
So, one power structure conceals another. Nevertheless, we must not
hasten to conclude that the material constitution of Europe is simply a mask
for ‘German Imperialism’, even if such imperialism really exists. Because
in some ways, the German hegemony that is currently active in Europe has no
choice but to be indirect, aided or not by context (in the case of the ‘Greek
punishment’, incidentally, it benefited from a multitude of favourable
conditions). In other ways it is partial, dependent on challenges
coming from several adversaries who also participate in the ‘power bloc’ to
varying degrees, adversaries who bring with them potentially deep
divisions. Undoubtedly, among these adversaries there are other European
countries (the coalition of which might eventually be able to equal the German
hegemony, except – as we have clearly seen in recent weeks – that they are held
back within and without by their financial, and increasingly their ideological,
dependence), and also – and of this we are convinced – the European
Central Bank (ECB).
Because the interest of the German economy (which wants to secure a
privileged position in the world market) is not the same as the banking
system’s economy (whose vault-key is the ECB, led by a former employee of
Goldmann Sachs), it would be completely erroneous to assume that Berlin and
Frankfurt are in harmony (in the same way, incidentally, as Mr Schäuble’s
aggressive moralism is not the same as the speculative pragmatism of the
monetary institution, as we have seen in the periodic conflicts between Mr
Draghi and Mr Weidmann). This is why, when discussing ‘neoliberalism’, it would
be prudent to be wary of the generalizations common amongst the members of the
extreme left, because a common ideological framework does not dictate one sole
politic and does not resolve conflicts of interest.
Without doubt, the ECB played a decisive role during the episode which
just unfolded, a role one has even labelled ‘terrorist’: by cutting off the
cash assets to Greek banks, the ECB forced the Greek government to close them
and to establish capital control, thereby placing the country’s economy on the
brink of asphyxia and compelling Tsipras to choose between surrender and chaos.
Schäuble and Dijsselbloem took advantage of this blackmail, a fact that does not indicate, however, that
this alliance works automatically. Draghi certainly did not want Greece to
leave the euro (whilst Schäuble paid little attention and might have actually
wanted Greece to leave in order to ‘tighten’ the zone around Germany): he took
a risk and it paid off (for the moment). The long term picture is a
different one altogether. The division within the synthesized European
‘governing body’ is also part of its ‘material constitution’.
At this point we can begin to contextualize the assertion made above:
that the agreement constitutes a fundamentally unenforceable diktat made up of
‘unrealistic and unachievable reforms’, (from Le Monde 14.07.2015,
a journal, in actual fact, that has relentlessly pushed for the adoption of
these reforms), a diktat that will be implemented by force to the point of
absurdity. Clearly, this will depend on the opposition that it sparks
(within Greece and, one would hope, outside Greece, because it concerns all of
Europe and all of Europe’s citizens), opposition that will grow and gain
credibility as the contradictions and destructive effects of the diktat are
exposed. But the opposition will depend on the consequences of the increasingly
varied strategies being employed by the European states with regard to the
crisis.
At this point and before penetrating the heart of the current
contradictions, a digression would be a good idea, one that might help us
reveal what resulted from the negotiations of the Brussels agreement of July
12-13.
‘Brussels night’
reveals Franco-German divisions
In general, political observers agree to divide up the European states
into four groups with regards to the ‘Greek crisis’ and its logical solution
(setting aside Great Britain, who does not count in this affair, especially
since it is itself busy discussing an eventual ‘Brexit’): Germany and its more
or less satellite countries, who align themselves to German politics or pre-empt
it (so as to serve as figureheads for the most ‘merciless’ German demands – dixit Le
Monde); the ‘poor countries’ of northern and eastern Europe who ‘conceded
important sacrifices’ in order to access the eurozone and who do not want the
Greeks to ‘benefit’; the ‘indebted’ countries of southern and western Europe
who accepted the austerity measures that were rejected by the Greeks and fared
variously in the aftermath; finally France (and in some sense Italy), who are
not really complying with the regulations of the ‘agreement on budgetary
discipline’, but who nevertheless wish to be considered as core members on the
European ‘executive board’.
In reality, this classification boils down to two groups, because the
anti-Greek competition between different European countries – other than France
and Italy (‘we can no longer be confident’, ‘we no longer agree to pay’) – was
directly used (if not orchestrated) by Germany in the Greek affair (where the ‘Schäuble
line’ prevailed over the ‘Merkel line’ in German politics). France alone,
tacitly supported by Italy, took a (moderately) different position (in
particular on the question of the Grexit).
Understanding the Franco-German division is the key, therefore, for at
its base it is pretty decisive, but evidently not for the reasons defended by
the French presidency.
With regard to the German government and its ‘inflexibility’, we believe
that ideology and politics have always played a more fundamental role than
economics (even if it is true that the German banks still have a huge chunk of
Greece’s net-worth, and that the German budget provides nearly a third of the
European Solidarity Fund’s resources). They reveal as much about German
interior politics as the objective to create a continental hegemony – this
‘German Europe’ which Ulrich Beck described in his now famous book; not as a
conquest but more like the project of a schoolmaster.
The two schemas devised by the Bundesfinanzministerium and
opportunistically leaked just before the reconvening of the Eurogroup – the
interim Greek exit from the euro (a temporary arrangement,
which everyone knew would become permanent); or the reduction of Greece to a
protectorate state, and the expropriation of its resources – were equal in
substance (from a political point of view), especially if one remembers that in
both cases the ultimate objective was actually to destroy the Tsipras
government. The second schema prevailed, due to the first’s difficulties of
‘principle’: it remains to be seen whether it will carry its project through
successfully (though it seems pretty close already).
So what happened on the French side of the crisis? Firstly we
could hypothesize, that in contrast to the Germans, at some point Hollande
became convinced that the only way of ‘forcing’ the austerity measures on the
Greek people was by ‘advising’ Tsipras to make Syriza shoulder their weight
(though this task will be much more difficult – if not impossible – given the
extreme nature of the measures imposed by the European summit). The referendum
itself (which infuriated the Germans and hardened their resolve to ‘smash’ the
Greek government) played a role in this sense. After all, Hollande
himself has some experience in breaking electoral promises and must have found it easy to imagine that others might do the same…
Two other factors weighed in to make him risk everything to ensure that
there would be no Grexit: the opinion of the French left – which mostly
supported Syriza – on the consequences of Greece’s expulsion; the conviction of
America’s hostile attitude towards the Grexit which stemmed from the dangers
that would arise in the financial international monetary system (since 2008 the
USA has nurtured an obsession with ‘systemic risk’). But the key is undoubtedly
the issue raised by Varoufakis in his article in the Guardian on
July 10, 2015: Germany is using the Greek situation to ‘discipline France’, to
impose budgetary discipline – which France is in fact incapable of putting into
practice – and to manipulate public opinion on the ‘sanctions’ which should
result. Again, the issue is political; it raises as many questions about
the distribution of power in Europe as about control over the dominant
discourse. On that fateful night, one might say that Hollande (perhaps helped
by Merkel against her own minister) ‘won the battle’ to keep Greece in the
euro. But he undoubtedly ‘lost’ on the conditions which were imposed for that, and
because it is these conditions that will determine what follows, we can assume that
his apparent ‘victory’ will not carry him very far…
The unresolved problems – inflamed by last week’s
standoffs – are inextricably ‘Greek’ and ‘European’ problems. Despite having to
examine them alternately and from both angles, in reality, this means once
again that they demonstrate to what extent Europe’s destiny is at stake in the
Greek question, and to what extent the Greek decisions (their resistance,
propositions, and eventually their errors and failures) lead to consequences
for the whole of Europe today.
Three general questions thrust themselves to the fore more prominently
than ever: the debt and political economy; the structural inequalities and new
relationships of domination; democracy and the danger of the extreme right.
An uncontrollable
European debt, a still unstable currency
Let us begin with the debt. It seems appropriate to remind ourselves of something
obvious: the cumulative European debt – public and private – is
still growing and generating its own toxic derivatives, and is
therefore putting the stability of the euro in permanent danger. It
possesses neither – in contrast to the USA – a compensation mechanism in the
form of a universally accepted and hoarded reserve currency, nor a central bank
which is authorized to ‘lend as a last resort’, and therefore involves both
speculative risks and risks of economic stagnation such as those that we are
seeing at the moment.
Most attention is being paid to public debt.
because: the States – since the 1880s – has been massively engaged in
institutional dependence on the financial markets; the bailouts and provisions
of liquid assets to private banks by the ECB (except when it is a question of
putting pressure on the Greek government) have had the result of continually
transferring the risk of speculative operations onto the citizens as taxpayers;
the neo-liberal political discourse has not stopped chastising the ‘spendthrift’ States. In actual fact, the bulk of the debt is private; debts that
force economies to hover between the Charybdis of indebtedness and the Scylla
of austerity policies.
This problem applies to Europe as a whole (even if the common currency
is not adopted by all its countries at the present time, and no doubt never
will be). The Greek debt represents without doubt a particular systemic risk
(which we are not reducing by strangling the Greek economy or strangling its
repayment possibilities!), but it is the whole system that is engaged on an
unhealthy course that would call for a joint solution – in other words
restructuring as part of the eurozone’s conversion into a coherent economic
space, not only integrated or ‘disciplined’ but oriented towards a
perspective of collective industrial development and transformation.
Hence the pertinence of the Greek government’s proposal to examine the
conditions of its own debt reduction and of its revival in the framework of a ‘pan-European
conference on debt’, – taking into consideration all the variables in the
problem and also taking the various stakeholders into account – a proposition
swiftly ruled out by the ‘institutions’ who did not even listen to them. The
Greek suggestion was indeed converging with the IMF’s conclusions after it
discovered the ‘mistaken calculation’ at the heart of its previous austerity
plan for Greece (which led it to no practical conclusions).
At this point, we might ask ourselves about the reasons behind the
unrelenting and insurmountable obstacle that prevents Europe from confronting
its financial problem rationally and on an appropriate level: what is it that
ceaselessly strives to find scapegoats? Nationalism and short-term egoism,
plainly, together with the aforementioned ideological obsessions, but also banking
interests and, once again, the anti-communitarian behaviour of one country
(Germany), a country which ceaselessly submits budgetary surpluses at the
expense of its neighbours and which has benefited over the long-term from the
considerable ‘transfers’ from indebted countries by making a profit on the
financial markets from the spread of national interest rates.
We can see why Germany will not be pressed to become involved in a common
struggle against corruption and tax evasion in its neighbours to the south,
whilst it is also the loudest critic of this corruption as it tries to justify
its imposition of trusteeship. In the same breath, Germany relentlessly places
the value and stability of a currency in danger, a currency whose character it
has proclaimed to be sacrosanct.
The Europe of
inequalities, fractures, and dominations
The debt question and its missing solution – a solution based on the
political will for a continental solidarity – raises a second issue, one that
is more worrying still for European futures: the development of internal
inequalities. They do not have a clear shape because they result from social
and historical causes which are immersed in the history of the continent as a
whole, and also because they stem from its successive divisions and
reunifications (neglecting here the rhetoric on ‘cultural differences’ which
the mass media and certain political commentators are fond of, with a flavour of
intra-European racism ).
Nevertheless, we might say that having tended to sway towards an
east-west axis (reinforced by the political divisions in Europe and by the
heterogeneity of its economic systems during the Cold War period) its internal
inequalities now seem to be based on a north-south axis. The pseudo-economic resolution
of the Greek crisis – coming after the ‘solutions’ enforced in Spain and
Portugal (where public accounts and the reliability of banks were reestablished
at the expense of an explosion in unemployment) – dramatically demonstrate the
size of the chasm which is deepening within a ‘unified’ Europe, for whom the
initial idea was to connect the reduction in enmities in the wake of war among its
peoples, by opening up the prospects of prosperity and synergy.
Obviously, this is the logic of a fanatical economic liberalism, the
same fanaticism that was enshrined by the latest generation of treaties: to
transform the comparative advantages into the development of inequalities and
finally into relationships of domination. Certain analysts on the radical left
– spurred on by the history of relations between the planet’s ‘North’ and
‘South’ – see this as an already advanced colonial relationship within the
borders of the European continent, including in the form of the Mediterranean
region’s ‘specialization in tourism’ and the offer of educated workforces to
the northern regions.
From this perspective, France (in industrial decline and with a high
and unfaltering unemployment rate) would hold an intermediary position, one
that is very hard to manage despite its size, and the new member states
of Mitteleuropa (having gone through the trial of ‘real
socialism’ and converted to the most intransigent market ideology) would
specialize in outsourcing to the profit of the dominant region.
This thesis is a simplified one, especially because it tends not to take
into account the social and territorial inequalities that are common internally
to every ‘region’ and country – inequalities amplified by neoliberal logic.
However, the formulation has the benefit of drawing our attention to both
the structural and virtually hostile character of the
polarizations taking place. For us, a more immediate and concrete
consideration should be added, one more closely linked to context: southern
Europe (primarily Greece and Italy) is not simply in the process of reproducing
forms of dependence and domination at its core, reproductions analogous to
colonization (in some ways ‘constructive’ and in others ‘deconstructive’). It
is also in organic relations with a new and increasingly unsettled and
unsettling ‘South’ (through the intermediary of the Mediterranean space to
which it belongs as much as to continental Europe), one that will be impossible
to contain behind walls or border operations. Of course, by a new ‘South’ we
mean the poverty- and refuge- driven migrations, threatened by civil wars and
backlashes from western interventions (whose consequences were never calculated
by those who initiated them).
Our line of argument is clear: if it is illusory to believe that we
could be following – or maintaining – ‘European construction’ through such polarization
and conflicts of interests (which are increasingly amplified across Europe), it
is even more illusory to believe that Europe would be able to exist as a
political body which can ‘neutralize’ and ‘hide’ the flows linked to
globalization that both stem from and end within.
What is confirmed for the IMF intervention – an organism that is
primarily charged with restructuring economies affected by currency collapse –
in the regulation of a budgetary dispute between the members of the euro zone,
also holds with regard to migratory flows and new conflicts in the ‘margins’ of
Europe. An increasingly divided Europe is also not completely contained ‘within
Europe’. Before disappearing from the scene, Mr Juncker had the time to
let out a cry of anger against the ‘egoism’ of the European states who refuse
to ‘share’ the burden of refugees: why did he not push clear-sightedness to its
conclusion, denouncing the aberration – which consists of dunking Greece’s head
underwater – one of the two states who
are facing their arrival on a daily basis? It will be too late after that to
build walls in the heart of the Balkans or on the shores of the Danube…
In the absence of
European democracy, state populism
The third is clearly the democratic problem,
highlighted in all its severity by the monstrous product of July 13, 2015 –
hence the problem of legitimacy of
powers in Europe. Time and time again, everyone has repeated it. But it should
be approached with all its components and in its current state
– moving away from only talking about the formal aspects of
the institutional crisis, no matter how important these aspects may be. At
least in appearance, the most serious of the arguments invoked before
(and a fortiori after) the referendum of July 5 by the European
governments in their effort to disqualify the Greek government’s demands for
negotiation (over debt, economy, and the future of the country in the European
construction) was as follows: the needs of one people or one EU member state
(or one member of the Eurozone) cannot outweigh the needs of 18 others (needs
which are expressed by their respective
governments, basing their legitimacy on regular elections).
This is likely to mirror a ‘communication component’ created in Brussels
and repeated in satiety by journal correspondents who are near the Commission (Le
Monde and Liberation in France in particular).
It contains the idea that a ‘part’ cannot decide for the ‘whole’ (any more, it
should be said, than ‘the whole’ can impose on one ‘part’ the sacrifice of its
own existence, except in a totalitarian regime). However, this only applies if,
independent of the detail of representative procedures, a contradictory
discussion occurred in which the ‘people’ – in the democratic sense of the term
(the ensemble of citizens who are to be represented and affected by the final
decision) – took part.
The European techno-structure and the political classes of different
countries (who enviously protect their monopoly of ‘mediation’ between the
national level and the European level) do not even want to hear it spoken
of. We were still very far from it when certain countries opened
referendums in 2005 about the ‘European constitution’ project, even though
there were some real moments of discussion and collective participation. But
the negative votes obtained in France and in the Netherlands (whatever the
complexity of their interpretation might be) were quickly used to disqualify
even the idea of popular consultation and to annul their results: conduct which
had a massive effect on the disaggregation of civic spirit in Europe and which
to some extent explains the violence of the reactions produced by the Greek
referendum of July 5.
A spectre is haunting Europe; the voice of the people – the power of the
people, even. But since the rise in democratic demands goes hand in hand
with the growing unease – and in some ways the anger – which is produced by the
shifting of political decisions from the nation-state towards supranational institutions
and the obscure organisms which are subject to no popular-control whatsoever, a
‘compensation’ package has been put into practice, a package which has
disastrous effects in the short term and terribly worrying effects for the
future.
By making the most of the fact that a large part of the dubious
sovereign debts were bought up by ‘public’ European organisms, the idea that
they are incessantly ‘paying for the Greeks’ (who would do nothing but squander
the money that is ‘given’ to them, when in fact most of this money is spent on
paying back the interests from previous loans) has been hammered into the minds
of the taxpayers of the different neighbouring countries, in addition to the
idea that they personally will ‘lose’ considerable sums of money if the Greeks
default without offering security (while these losses are virtual sums whose
actual impact on the finances of each country depends entirely on the economic
context).
The implementation of this state propaganda which is taking hold of
public opinion, generates a populism, or rather an extremism ‘of the
centre’ (to employ the expression used by sociologist Ulrich
Bielefeld) that is particularly forceful in Germany, but also in France and in
the Netherlands, and institutionalized in countries like Finland where its
convergence with xenophobia can clearly be seen. As a result, the
economic crisis develops as a gap in representation which is linked to the fact
that there is absolutely no institutional possibility for European citizens – whether
as individuals, or as territories, or indeed as local, national or
transnational communities – to actually control the decisions
which are taken in their name (the European parliament being no more than an
empty shell, a shell that played no role whatsoever in the examination of the
Greek default and its wider consequences, except for the provocative and
contemptuous declarations made by its president Mr. Schulz).
But the crisis is also increasingly taking the form of the revenge of
aggressive nationalism (anti-Greek, anti-German) and xenophobia, at once
against internal ‘minorities’ and against external competitors, and joining
with the development of organized forces, collective passions and
anti-political and anti-European discourse.
It is the governments themselves who are the instigators of this massive
populism (rarely described as such) and so are the parties forming the ‘great
coalition’ of conservatives and social-democrats holding political power in
Europe today, in close collaboration with technocracy and finance. But it is
the movements of neo-fascists who – to varying degrees – are preparing to do
well from the situation and who are already making the most of it by making
their presence felt in the daily life of each country. We have already
gone far enough in this direction, whether under the cover of the protection of
‘national identity’ or of the need for ‘defence’ against migrants and
minorities.
The ‘democratic invention’ (to echo Claude Lefort) which Europe needs
today must happen both in the form of an institutional creation –
instituting the principles of representation and deliberation completely
missing in all echelons of real power – and in the form of an active
citizenship, that is to say a mobilization of the mass of citizens (which
one might call ‘counter-populism’) on all fronts which require transnational
responsibility (from the freedom of information to the environment, not
forgetting workers’ rights, the mobilization of unstable and unemployed
migrants, and the fight against corruption and tax evasion).
It is no exaggeration to say that Syriza, before and after its rise to
power and in the same way as other European movements (Indignados, Podemos),
succeeded in awakening great hopes amongst the most advanced faction of the
European left, because it was moving precisely in that direction: this,
without doubt, is no stranger to the obstinacy with which it was attacked with
the result that we can see. This is why, in tentative conclusion on this
analysis of the diktat of Brussels and its consequences, we arrive
– with the prudence that is appropriate when we are speaking from the exterior
of a country or of a movement – at some hypotheses and some reflections on the
achievements of the Greek left (as well as on the critical situation in which
it currently finds itself).
Syriza’s strategic
dilemma
The Greek parliament has just adopted the Brussels Memorandum in the
prescribed terms (the sine qua non condition
for primary rescue funds to be unblocked and banks reopened). The acceptance
came as a clear majority, the old parties of government voted in favor but with
a strong minority opposition that included about thirty Syriza MPs (after the
central committee of the party itself rejected the agreement by a small
majority). Tsipras, the prime minister declared (with a phrase that has spread
worldwide): he ‘didn’t believe’ in the economic virtues of the Brussels plan,
but he had to accept it in order to avoid ‘disaster’ both for Greece and
Europe. He thus took responsibility, and he demanded solidarity. Strikes and
demonstrations are taking place. What is the lesson to learn from these latest
developments? What conclusions can we draw on the immediate future and on the
long-term consequences?
The first observation is that the discussion on the value and the terms
of the Brussels ‘package’ has begun even before its implementation. This
is true in Greece, clearly, but also abroad – including within public opinion
and in the press organs that ask themselves the question of whether, in going
‘too far’, Germany and the EU have not actually sapped the conditions of their
authority. If the answer turns out to be yes, it would mean that the ‘question
of trust’ has switched sides… But for this, we will have to wait and see how the
implementation takes shape. Once the shock of the new austerity measures has
been absorbed by Greek society if it is able to survive them (the first major
uncertainty), Tsipras’s government – for its part and if it stays in
power (second uncertainty) – promises: an obstinate fight to exploit
each trace of and every possibility for autonomy left in the signed documents
(a good example being the management of the ‘guarantee funds’ which unify Greek
assets); a systematic resistance to the idea that the most impoverished social
categories should bear the brunt of the charges, notably the fiscal ones; a
renewed offensive against corruption; and a renewed insistence on the question
of the structural causes of debt. None of these will happen without a
fight (not long ago we would have said ‘without a class war’…), but all this
might shake things up.
Paradoxically, the main ‘external’ support at Tsipras’s disposal in this
combat currently comes in the form of statements from the IMF. This is because
the IMF is refusing to play the role that Brussels assigned to it, publicizing
its radically pessimistic analysis of the ‘supportability’ of the Greek debt,
and by calling on Europe to do more to reduce it. It would be difficult to
underestimate the importance of this statement of position, in view of its
timing. It signifies that the IMF – recently involved in the attempts to
align Greek dependence with the norms of the ‘Third World’ (as in the
Argentinian case) – might create internal contradictions in the system by
acting as a ‘reverse mediator’. This corresponds to a balancing of the
relationship between international financial interests and intra-European
political objectives. One might think (or hope) that this marks the creeping
beginnings of ‘renegotiation’, even if in the short term it induces all the
governments in the Eurogroup to harden their pressure for the ‘fulfilment
of the commitments made’. Mr. Schäuble, on his part, never forgetting to play both
cards, has seized the occasion to relaunch the idea of a ‘temporary Grexit’.
The second element in the strategic dilemma, more important still, concerns
Greece’s interior situation (social, moral, political). Greek society is rich
in solidarities that have been defended and used against the barrage of
impoverishment and hopelessness over the last months and years. But it is
exhausted, and it is divided along lines of class and ideology that could shift
at any time, perhaps brutally. This depends on the course of events, but also
very much on the way in which governmental action is perceived: as ‘treason’ or
as ‘resistance’. In our eyes, it is crucial that Tsipras (just yesterday in his
speech at the Vouli and in his letter to the MPs of Syriza) perseveres in his
resolution to ‘speak truth’ about the constraints, the perspectives and
intentions of his government – by adopting a typically parrhesiastic posture, in the
tradition of Greek democracy. It is no less crucial that, under the pressure of
great tensions (which could triumph tomorrow), the unity of Syriza on ‘the
verge of ruin’ is still resisting. But Tsipras was forced to make changes in
his government and to call risky elections in the near future. Let us try to
make the conditions of Syriza’s extremely fragile balance more clear.
The first point in question is whether or not Tsipras was right to call
the referendum when he did and how he did, taking the double risk of
‘provoking’ the anger of the European powers who wanted to continue to maneuver
behind closed doors, and also of producing the immense disillusionment and
anger of the people (in particular the young people), people brutally
confronted with overwhelming exterior forces and a mockery of democracy.
On balance, we think that he was, for the reason that – using Chantal
Mouffe’s terms that were reused by Ulrike Guerot in Die Zeit –
the referendum has traversed the occult ‘governance’, and generated a real
‘return of politics’ in the European crisis that is irreversible in some ways. Questions
over the interests and of the voice of the
people – notwithstanding those over the publicity of decisions
that concern common interest – were clearly raised. Better still, an
ideological confrontation took place: the dominant camp of Greece’s rivals (Schäuble,
Juncker, Dijsselbloem…) claimed that the aim of the ‘no’ at the referendum was
to exit the euro, whilst Tsipras maintained that his mandate, and the
proposition which he was submitting to vote, was both to remain in
the eurozone and to refuse austerity measures – a demand for
a new Europe therefore. Our feeling is that he won the battle
on the question of principle, even if he lost the war that ensued due to a
crippling combination of forces.
This immediately takes us to a second question: was Tsipras right to
speak of an imminent ‘disaster’ in the face of which the only responsible
attitude was to fold without actually collapsing in principle? On this point,
the response seems to us to be even more clearly in the affirmative. On one
side, the collapse of public finances in Greece and the impossibility of
financing economic and daily life was an inescapable reality (whose dark
perspectives were highlighted again in the IMF’s report), and in this sense the
‘terrorist’ blackmail worked well. Whilst on the other side, the perspectives
for the positive (and even conquering) use of the ‘Grexit’ – being flagged up by the
‘Marxist wing’ of Syriza’s representatives as well as by theorists from both
the extreme left and the extreme right – never even had an outside chance of
success. If they were not simply expressing fundamental opposition to the idea
of the European construction, they were based on an archaic conception of
the autonomy of (small) nations in a globalized economy; on inapplicable and
authoritarian conceptions of the ‘control’ of monetary politics and of the
circulation of capital (a kind of modernization of ‘war communism’); and on a
profound lack of consciousness regarding the impact of savage devaluation and
competitiveness-at-all-costs on the lives of the working classes. It is true
that some might reply that austerity is already insupportable and only promises
to worsen, but this brings us back to a former problem: the problem of applying
(or not) the terms of the agreement. In any event, the politics of making
things worse makes no sense.
The unity of Syriza – as a
‘governmental’ party and above all as a movement – seems to us to be both the
most difficult and the most decisive element. It is the most difficult because
the rifts are very real, and also because unity cannot be decreed – it depends
on social conditions as much as on a political willingness. It is the most
decisive because at the present time there is a maximum push from the European
‘centre’ to create a rupture. The German press (Suddeutsche Zeitung)
speaks profusely of Syriza’s ‘schizophrenia’ – they want both to uphold their criticisms
of the agreement and also to stay in power in order to put it into practice
on their own terms. It orders Tsipras to ‘clarify’ his intentions by
‘shedding’ the leftists that surround him, continuing the narrative about ‘lack
of trust’ in the process. And the Greek parties once disqualified by their past politics, who ‘supported’
him in parliament, are lying in wait to replace Tsipras. The ‘rebellion’
of Syriza’s MPs who voted against the agreement seems to us to be absolutely
legitimate, and to belong to the democratic experience propelled at the heart
of the crisis. But it ought not, without fatal risks, to play into the hands of
the adversaries. Besides, the rebellion is not ideologically uniform
because only one part of the opponents is motivated by a fundamental hostility
to the European construction; others (including such leading figures as Varoufakis
and Zoe Konstantopoulou) always demonstrated their engagement in the combat for
a ‘new Greece’ leading to a ‘new Europe’ in both words and in deeds.
If
Syriza’s unity holds in spite of the internal tensions (which mirror the same
conflicts in the bosom of the Greek people and of public opinion), the
government will itself be able to hold on, to resist against pressure from the
right and from the extreme right, and so the dialectic of application and of
resistance will be able to launch itself. If this unity does not hold, we are
entering the unknown, and will bid farewell to the hope that this movement has
awakened in Greece and in Europe (and even beyond). The reader understands
where our hopes lie, though they are based on nothing certain.
‘Long March’ for
Europe: our solidarities
In his speech in the Vouli, Tsipras clearly said: the solution that we
had to choose was not the best one; it was simply the least disastrous. And he
specified: for Greece but also for Europe. It is a
consistent position which he has defended since his rise to power, and notably
at the moment of the referendum: ‘our mandate is not the exit from Europe’, that
the vast majority of the Greek population do not want. Implicitly, our
mandate is to fight without respite for the emergence of a new Europe, a Europe
in which Greece – free from its oligarchical privileges and from the corruption
that was encouraged by the creditors themselves – will have its rightful
position and might even serve as a model for others. This was the theme of the
article published in May 2015 in Le Monde: ‘Europe is at a
crossroads’ (31.05.2015). This unwavering commitment does us a great service,
creating responsibilities – if not obligations – for us as well.
It now appears that the European alternative to the neoliberal
construction of Europe stemming from Maastricht – with its destructive
effects and its insurmountable contradictions – at least presents itself as a
much more difficult task, strewn with many more obstacles than many among us
would have believed possible. Europe has undertaken a long journey to rise
‘from the top’ or ‘from the bottom’ out of its constitutional crisis, to invent
the conditions of its citizenship, to assemble the forces of its cultural
renewal. Greece is, and will be, at the heart of the clashes and the
challenges. By testifying our unfaltering support to Greece, down to the daily
necessities, based on the appreciation (and free criticism) of the vicissitudes
that it is going through, it is ourselves that we will be helping. We must find
the forms of this solidarity and make them effective. We must also remember the
thing that placed Syriza in the situation in which it finds itself today, that
which contributed to the imbalancing of forces and that which facilitated
the diktat: it is, to a great extent, the insufficiency of
this solidarity (or the ineffectiveness of this solidarity – which amounts to
the same thing).
The efforts of the Greeks to keep the extraordinary democratic power
alive that was demonstrated in the popular gatherings of Syntagma and in the
referendum campaign – and in order to find new points for its application –
should be responded to by connecting to it our own capacity to organize
movements and campaigns that help to garner support for its cause amongst
public opinion (or that in the end converge with it).
These movements and campaigns must be without exclusions, emphasizing
internal discussion and therefore embodying the renewal of politics without which
there can be no ‘constituent moment’ in Europe. They must cross borders
– protecting themselves at all costs from nationalism and ‘populist’ emulation
with such nationalist anti-European currents that are clearly on the rise (like
the French National Front) – even when it might seem that the denunciation of
the same ‘ills’ (technocracy, elitist corruption, disdain for the people,
fiscal pressure) might produce a common ground for a parallel rhetoric.
What exactly could be better for this new intra-European
internationalism than to find itself gathering in Athens, on the side of the
Greek people? But we would like to add that it exists also in Germany, at the
heart of what appears to be the ‘fortress’ of neo-capitalism and which is in
fact itself filled with contradictions and rich in alternative possibilities;
in Spain, alongside Podemos – burdened now with the task of
thinking up a new challenge to the system; in France, where social-democracy is
converting itself into ‘republican’ patriotism, ‘competitive destruction’ and
the commercialization of its culture; in Italy, where the battle against the
‘fortification’ and the ‘militarisation’ of European borders is taking place
and where struggles and resistance within and against the crisis continue to be
strong, although politically dispersed; in England, where the debate for or
against isolationism is about to take place (against a background of the
privatization of all of its social services)…
Finally and above all, we need mottoes
around which the solidarities – the convergent objectives for democratic
renovation and resistance to austerity – from the different regions of the
continent can be clearly seen. The audit of the debt undertaken
by the Greek parliament is in itself an example – by thereafter giving substance
to the idea of a new economy and of a new monetary politics,
like those proposed by movements like ATTAC. The invention of new forms of
labour organization and struggle, able to cope with the new nature of
financialized capitalism, as well as of new social rights and welfare systems,
follow from there. Resistance to security politics; the defense of
the freedom of circulation and information is another
objective. And these are not the only ones.
As Alexis Tsipras wrote in 2015: there are two roads opening for Europe. As difficult as it may be to oppose dominant
policies, we believe that the choice is always there, more vital than ever. The
opportunities must be created. This will take the time that it needs. But it
need not wait.
Thanks go to Asher Korner for preparing this translation for openDemocracy from the French.
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