Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, center, walks with officials as he tours in the port of Aden, Yemen, Monday, Jan. 4, 2016.Wael Qubady /Press Association. All rights reserved. Thirteen months into the full scale war which has
encompassed the country, negotiations started in Kuwait on 21 April between the
Saleh-Huthi alliance who control the Yemeni northern highlands and the capital
Sana’a and the internationally recognised government of president Hadi who was
elected in 2012, and has been in exile in Riyadh for most of the last year.
A month into the talks, their main achievement is that they
have not definitively broken down. Insofar as any negotiations are taking
place, it is thanks to the systematic interventions from the Shaikh of Kuwait
or other senior figures from different countries to bring one or the other side
back to the table after their routine almost daily walk outs. Ismail Ould
Cheikh Ahmed, the UN special adviser and his team do their best and this time,
at least, have real support from the international community.
While naïve observers might think that the ongoing and
worsening suffering of 25 million Yemenis might have brought the warring
parties to their senses to seek a solution without imposing further starvation,
thirst, destitution and death, it would seem they consider this irrelevant.
Ensconced in their luxury hotels in Riyadh or their
protected environments in Sana’a, living conditions of the population appear to
be the least of their concerns. Instead, their petty rivalries, long-standing
feuds and greed for power and control determine their tactics. Any planning
they may be doing for the future may well focus more on how they will
appropriate future external humanitarian and development funding.
So, why are these negotiations taking place? Answering this
question may also help to understand their likely outcome. In addition to the
military stalemate, and the collapsed economy, the role of external actors is as
relevant today as it was to reach the Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement of
2011 and the transitional regime which followed it.
Saudi Arabia’s changed policies
First Saudi Arabia: to many people’s surprise, the regime
installed in January 2015 under king Salman, is behaving differently from its
predecessors, in Yemen and beyond. Although only Deputy Crown prince, young
Mohammed bin Salman, the king’s favourite son, has taken a leading role and
clearly wants to demonstrate his capacity as an effective ruler, anticipating
his own rise to the highest position. Saudi Arabia
has been less than happy about western media coverage of the destruction and
killings caused by its coalition air strikes, let alone votes in the European
and Dutch parliaments opposing continued arms sales.
Initially, in the face of the takeover of Yemen by a Zaydi
group allied with former president Saleh which could, with some exaggeration,
be described as a Shi’a faction aligned with Iran, he most probably thought
that a short military intervention would do the trick, with an unarguable
victory. So he rapidly put together the coalition[1]
which started aerial bombing of Yemen on 26 March 2015. By now, 14 months
later, the quick win he had anticipated is further than ever, despite spending
millions, sending ground troops, arousing considerable anti-Saudi public
opinion throughout the world, not to mention the killing and destruction in
Yemen and some in Saudi Arabia itself.
He wants to move on: financial constraints, pressure from
the US and others, disagreements with Saudi Arabia’s main ally, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) on the solution, and the loss of popularity of the war at home
are incentives to end the adventure.
Saudi Arabia has been less than happy about the western media
coverage of the destruction and killings of civilians caused by its coalition
air strikes, let alone the votes in the European and Dutch parliaments opposing
continued arms sales. From a public
relations point of view, regardless of international humanitarian law, bombing
Médecins sans Frontières hospitals was not a great move.
The regime needs success at home to mute opposition to Mohammed
bin Salman’s innovative policies within the ruling clique. His priority are
younger Saudis and domestic policy: this month he issued Saudi Arabia Vision
2030, a strategy straight off the books of a US PR company, more reminiscent of
Dubai than of conservative Saudi Arabia.
So for Saudi Arabia, a solution to the Yemeni problem which
must look like a victory is now a priority. Recent direct talks and
negotiations with the Huthis have led to agreements which suggest a possible
solution between these two elements of the complex political picture.
Other external pressures
The UAE is the other main GCC player in the coalition and its
divergence from Saudi Arabia’s strategy relates to the role of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The Islah party in Yemen has a strong Muslim Brotherhood component
including Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, recently appointed Vice President in Hadi’s
government, who is considered to subscribe to its extremist wing. While Saudi
Arabia has restored cooperation with Islah, anything remotely associated with
Muslim Brothers is totally unacceptable for the UAE who probably consider that
organisation a far bigger threat than Iran. Oman, which has been active for the
past year in trying to bring about a solution, continues its efforts through an
active presence in Kuwait.
The USA make regular statements in support of a solution. Torn
between wanting to keep Saudi Arabia as happy as possible given disagreement
over the Iran nuclear deal and its belief that Al Qaeda and Daesh are expanding
their control and influence in Yemen, it is supporting the UN’s role in the
talks. Britain’s active involvement in supporting the negotiations also
prioritises the same counter-terrorism agenda. Other ambassadors support the
talks, with the EU Delegate leading as she has the longest sustained connection
and knowledge of the individuals involved in the talks. The United Nations
Security Council Permanent Five states are still united about Yemen.
The situation on the ground
Shiite Houthi tribesmen show support for the Houthi movement in Sanaa, Yemen, May 19, 2016, after Yemeni Foreign Minister announces another suspension of Kuwait peace talks. Hani Mohammed /Press Association. All rights reserved.There is no doubt that the military stalemate is a major
reason leading to the Kuwait negotiations.
After 14 months of full-scale war on the ground and massive aerial
bombings, the military situation is largely unchanged. Without going into
details, overall, the northern Zaydi highlands are under the control of the Saleh
Huthi alliance, bordered by a number of hot fronts, Nehm about 60km east of
Sana’a, Jawf and Mareb beyond it, on the Red Sea coast along the Saudi border,
south in Taiz governorate, extending to the Bab al Mandab strait, south east
around al Baidha, with intermittent fighting in various other locations. Aden is, since that time, a city whose daily routine
includes assassinations, kidnappings, suicide attacks, demonstrations of
government employees demanding payment, demonstrations by southern separatists
with occasional electricity and water supplies.
For the past 9 months, the people remaining in Taiz city are
suffering more than any others, as parts of the city are controlled by each
side and it is besieged by Huthi-Saleh forces who maintain a firm blockade of
all goods along its main access roads; there are only very occasional air drops
of supplies, food and medical supplies to the zones under resistance control. Its
situation can be compared with Aleppo in Syria. What are officially described
as ‘pro-Hadi’ forces are really ‘anti-Saleh-Huthi’ ones. While some may be
fighting to retain Yemen as a unified state under an improved regime (this can
mean a more Islamist one or a more democratic regime focused on addressing the
socio-economic needs of the population). Either way none of them can be said to
be supporting Hadi’s presidency.
Aden was named the temporary capital when Hadi spent a few
weeks there between escaping from Sana’a and its occupation by Saleh Huthi
forces driving him out to Riyadh. Four months of fighting ensued. This combined
ground fighting between the efficient and organised Saleh Huthi military forces
of the Republican Guards on the one hand, and on the other, coalition
airstrikes supporting resistance forces of local separatists without a jihadist
agenda, popular committee members from neighbouring governorates, and jihadists
from al Qaeda and other Salafis.
It was only the intervention of coalition ground forces,
under Emirati command, which finally ‘liberated’ Aden in late July. I use
quotation marks because Aden is, since that time, a city whose daily routine
includes assassinations, kidnappings, suicide attacks, demonstrations of
government employees demanding payment, demonstrations by southern separatists
with occasional electricity and water supplies. Aden airport has been open and
operating for a few days throughout that period but is most of the time closed
due to the threat of missiles or artillery. Since its ‘liberation’, President
Hadi and his government have only spent a few weeks there, each time driven out
by an attack.
Further east, namely in the other governorates of the former
PDRY, local authorities manage some areas. Dhala’ and Lahej are southern
separatist strongholds while others places have been described as being under
the control of al Qaeda. In recent weeks, the coalition has focused military
action on the latter, coastal Hadramaut and its capital Mukalla and the smaller
towns on the coast of Abyan governorate. Although these successes have been
trumpeted as major victories, with fanciful figures of the number of AQAP killed,
reality is somewhat different: AQAP’s control was over-stated, there is
evidence to suggest that its forces were allowed to leave with heavy weapons,
presumably dispersing elsewhere. Their departure from towns in Abyan and Shabwa
was negotiated by local leaders who wanted to avoid coalition strikes. Finally AQAP
is a wide umbrella which includes genuine aggressive armed fundamentalists but
also men who work directly or indirectly to orders from Saleh and other senior
politicians.
How about the people?
The cease fire which started on 10 April initially considerably
reduced air strikes, with some days when none occurred, but these, as well as
fighting on the ground have returned to their earlier level as the Kuwait talks
stalled. When talks show some signs of progress, however small, air strikes and
fighting reduce: they increase as the talks are interrupted. Reduced fighting
has allowed for some improvements in the delivery of basic foodstuffs and aid,
despite the fact that the amounts landing in the ports have been way below
requirements. The UN’s humanitarian appeal is “only
asking for the minimum that is required to keep people alive in these awful
circumstances," and only targets 65% of those in need, but has only
received 16% of the funds required.
Fourteen months of intensive air strikes failed to destroy
the military capacity of the Saleh-Huthi factions, but successfully killed
thousands [air strikes are responsible for over half of the 6,400 dead],
destroyed and damaged most of the country’s road and other infrastructure, more
than 27,000 homes and other buildings, 600 medical facilities, and 1170 schools
by mid-April this year. Of the 700,000 people needing emergency livelihoods
assistance, ie unable to earn an income, UN organisations were able to assist
108,000 in April, while it helped none of the half million needing ‘livelihoods
restoration assistance’. The situation of the country’s finances is subject to
debate but, according
to PM
bin Daghr, ‘the CBY’s foreign reserves reached an all-time low last month
of $1.3 billion, which is 28% of the prewar level of reserves of $4.6 billion.’
The exchange rate of the US dollar has reached unprecedented heights, and traders
are no longer selling basic staples, in anticipation of shortages, purchase
price rises and Ramadan. An indicator of Sana’a rulers’ desperation, is
the creation of an emergency economic committee on 18 May.
The disastrous humanitarian situation continues to worsen. More
than 21 million Yemenis [out of 26] need basic assistance and 2.8 million are
displaced. In April, the World Food Programme
reached 3.6 million of the 7.6 million people on the verge of starvation. The
blockade preventing the arrival of foodstuffs and fuel continues, despite an
agreement for inspection with the UN. Unlike people in many countries most
Yemenis, faced with the shame of being unable to feed their families, are more
likely to lock the doors of their houses and wait to die inside with their
families, rather than beg and travel in search of help. How many have already done this? No one knows. In the words of the senior UN
humanitarian official, its humanitarian
appeal is “only asking for the minimum that is required to keep people alive
in these awful circumstances," and only targets 65% of those in need, but
has only received 16% of the funds required.
What next?
Faced with two stubborn and self-serving negotiating teams,
can the Kuwait talks bring about peace, stability and development to Yemen’s 26
million people? Based on nothing other than a debatable legitimacy, the
internationally recognised government is totally dependent on external forces:
without coalition air strikes and ground troops, it would have become
irrelevant long ago. It depends on the GCC states for everything. The Saleh-Huthi
alliance is ‘contre nature’: open disagreements and clashes have become
increasingly frequent in recent months, certainly something the coalition
encourages. Recent border agreements between the Huthis and Saudi Arabia, excluding
Saleh and his allies, are an indication of future trends. However exclusion of
Saleh and his forces depends on a decisive shift in favour of the Huthis in the
military balance within this alliance, something which is not yet clear. Though
militarily weakened, they still control the central and northern highlands, which
represent about 25% of the country’s surface but closer to 50% of its
population. Other than military pressure, their main constraint is financial,
something which is becoming more serious by the day. Increasing unpopularity is
not a decisive factor for either side.
It is clear to all that the military stalemate is unlikely
to be broken and therefore some kind of political solution is essential. Both
teams are sticking to untenable positions in the talks and refusing to
compromise. However, given the external pressures from Saudi Arabia, other GCC
states, the US, UK, EU and indeed everyone else, it is likely that some kind of
deal will eventually be made. What this might be is difficult to imagine. It
may well exclude both Saleh and Hadi. It will most likely include the Huthi and
Islah, as well as some sections of the General People’s Congress [currently
split between Saleh and Hadi supporters] as well as some of the smaller
parties. Its form is likely to involve returning to most of what the transition
achieved by 2014, and here it might be helpful
to revisit its lessons[2]
to avoid some of the mistakes made earlier.
Unfortunately, whatever agreement is reached in Kuwait is
unlikely to transform Yemen into a stable well-governed state in full control
of the country and focused on the welfare of its people. The kleptocratic
elites are too powerful to be excluded, and such measures are not on the agenda
of the international community. Fragmentation and bitterness have increased
exponentially in the past year, not only in the southern governorates, but
throughout the country. There is no
doubt that an end to air strikes and to full-scale war on the ground would be a
major improvement.
Much more needs to be done to establish a politically viable
system but, more than anything, to restore the population’s basic living
standards to their pre-war status, which would leave them as the poorest in the
Arab world by a long stretch. Regardless of politics, financial and economic
support for development, particularly in rural areas will be essential for the
coming decades. Of all the country’s fundamental problems, this article has not
even mentioned the main long term one, namely the absolute shortage of water.
[1] In
addition to the GCC states (except Oman)
the coalition includes Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, and Sénégal, all of whom have little choice unless willing
to forego the considerable financial support they get from the GCC.
[2] See my detailed
analysis of the transition process and its outcomes published earlier this
year by International IDEA:
Yemen's 'Peaceful' Transition from Autocracy: Could it have succeeded?