Shutterstock/Xtock. All rights reserved.There are signs of previously unknown levels of
cooperation and alignment between the United States and the key Sunni states in
the region, which could lead to a power-sharing agreement that satisfies their
strategic interests.
The principal events are as
follows:
In October, a group of 53
Saudi imams unaffiliated with the government called for a jihad against the
Russian, Iranian and Syrian governments. The group went even further than official
condemnation and likened the Russian intervention to the 1980 war in
Afghanistan—which led to the birth of Al Qaeda, in case anyone has forgotten.
It is significant that the Saudi government allowed or was not able to stop the
communication; the former would indicate approval of the intensified message
while the latter would imply weakness and the desire of the Saudis to avoid
internal dissension from the more radical clergy.
On 5 November, the USAF announced
the deployment of six F-15C Eagles to Incirlik AFB in Turkey. That is
interesting, because unlike the F-15E Strike Eagle the F-15C is a pure air
superiority fighter that has no ground attack role, yet ISIS has no air force.
The mission is to protect Turkish airspace; but from what? The only planes
flying over Syria belong to the Combined Joint Task Force, to Russia or to the
Syrian government.
On 24 November, a Turkish F-16 shot
down a Russian Su-24 that had momentarily violated Turkish airspace. This
act goes far beyond Turkish aspirations in Syria and involves a much wider
Russo-Turkish competition encompassing the Black Sea and the Caucasus; but the
fact that military action was taken in this particular theatre is significant
and may indicate that Turkey is prepared to act more aggressively than previous
indicated.
On 5 December, the Iraqi government
officially accused the Turkish government of an “illegal
incursion” of troops into northern Iraq. This was in response to the
rotation of about 150 trainers to an Iraqi camp north of Mosul, which has been
a largely routine occurrence until now. Yet, freakish as this protest might
seem, it was serious enough for the Turkish ambassador to be summoned to
Baghdad and the Turkish government to issue
a warning to all of its nationals to leave Iraq.
On 9 December, US Secretary of Defense
Ash Carter announced during a visit to Iraq that the US was “ready
to do more” to assist the Iraqi Army to finish the job against the Islamic
State. The secretary’s call echoed his statement
on 6 November at Camp David, when he said: “We would welcome working with those countries on the ground because
they would have a distinctive advantage in a ground fight.”
Also on 9 December, Syrian opposition
groups agreed to a Saudi-proposed
framework for talks and to unify in the face of a Russian-backed loyalist
resurgence. The road remains rocky as many of the rebel groups courteously despise
each other,
but the possibility of a unified Sunni rebel front is highly significant.
These events occur in the context of a significant offensive
by Assad’s loyalist forces, backed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, to recapture
the initiative and retake critical territory around Hama, Aleppo and Homs. The
fighting has been intense and the progress has been slow—mainly because of the
anti-tank guided weapons the Gulf states have been providing to the Syrian rebels—but
progress is being made. The immediate threat to Latakia and the Alawite
heartland has eased; the beleaguered garrison of Kweiras AFB has been relieved
after a two-year siege; and the threat to the strategic north-south supply
lines has been pushed back. It is not victory; but for a regime on the point of
collapse just three months ago, it is an important turnaround.
Many of the rebel groups courteously despise each other, but the possibility of a unified Sunni rebel front is highly significant.
This has put a great deal of pressure on the Saudis. Their
Syrian proxies are suffering serious setbacks; in Iraq, the victories are being
won either by Shia Hashed militias (Bayji, Ramadi) or else by the Kurdish
Peshmerga (Sinjar). The Gulf states don’t have any beef against the Kurds per
se, but the Iraqi Shia militias are being openly trained and supplied by Iran. King
Salman is not secure enough on his throne to suffer grievous loss of prestige
lightly; he faces the very real possibilities of either a palace coup or a
radicalisation of his already radical subjects should his leadership lead to a
Sunni defeat in Syria and Iraq.
Turkey is also under pressure. President Erdogan faces
plenty of domestic opposition due to his authoritarian manner and the vast
corruption of his AKP apparatchiks; only by picking a fight with the Kurds and
taking a hardline in Syria was he able to secure a narrow parliamentary
majority in a November second election, after the previous one delivered a hung
parliament. Furthermore, the country faces a resurgent Russia that has thrashed
Georgia, occupied Crimea, is playing footsy with Azerbaijan and Armenia, and
now has the better part of a frontal aviation regiment in Syria with ground
troops to defend their bases. After 400 years of fighting off the Russians, the
last thing the Turks want is to be encircled by them.
These setbacks seem to have brought the ‘Sunni coalition’
closer together. Goaded on by the United States, the Turks and Saudis may be
prepared to move beyond supplies and munitions to use of ground forces in an
effort to redress the situation. It would not be precisely the “invasion
of Iraq” that the Shia parliamentarians in Baghdad have been screaming
about, but it wouldn’t be too far off the mark. What would this look like in
practice?
Ground Force Commitment: the Americans, the Gulf states and the Turks would each agree
to contribute a certain number of troops to ‘defeat the Islamic State’. The
Americans would contribute a small number of light troops—special forces, light
infantry—and the airpower. The Turks and Gulf states would provide more
conventional forces: mechanised infantry, armour, and artillery.
Diplomatic screen: there
is no possibility of a UN resolution authorising any sort of military action in
Syria—the Russians would veto it. However, the west has already set a
(dangerous) precedent for use of force without Security Council sanction: the
air campaign against Serbia was conducted exclusively under NATO auspices. In
this case, the diplomatic cover would be provided by the Arab League, which
has already
sanctioned military action against the Houthis in Yemen.
In Iraq, no diplomatic screen is required. The United States and European Union
will put Baghdad under enormous pressure to force Prime Minister al Abadi to
agree to accept the “gracious assistance” of the Gulf states to defeat the
Islamic State threat.
Military action in Iraq: the Gulf States would deploy regular
forces alongside Sunni Hashed militias (like the ones the Turks were supposed
to be training near Mosul) and the Iraqi Army. These would focus on retaking
the predominantly Sunni Anbar province from ISIS and keeping it free of Shia
militias. The Americans would operate as they did with the Northern Alliance:
as embedded forward observers calling in airstrikes and in limited engagements
to take out high-value targets or deal with limited pockets of ISIS resistance.
US troops would not be leading the charge.
Military action in Syria: the Turks would move substantial ground
units into northern Syria to provide a “safe zone” for Syrian refugees. This
would coincide with the establishment of a US-backed no-fly zone over said safe
zone (we wouldn’t want to bomb civilians by accident, would we?). This safe
haven would be fully endorsed by the US and European Union, both of whom want
something done to keep Syrian refugees away from their borders. It will also
act as a safe haven for rebels fighting al Assad, for the flow of munitions and
volunteers, and for Islamic State oil (the spice must flow).
Press offensive: all of this will be touted as concrete steps taken in the
wake of the Paris massacre to ensure the destruction of ISIS. Indeed, it is
quite possible that the French will be invited to
suggest and lead some of these measures.
The endgame is therefore to checkmate Russia and Iran
through the imposition of sufficient military forces as to prevent them from
accomplishing their goals, while forestalling a direct military response
through the threat of escalation. If Russia challenges the Turkish safe zone
too directly, Turkey can invoke the mutual defence clause of the North Atlantic
Treaty. If Iran challenges the situation in Iraq too directly, the US by itself
has adequate forces to deal with any incursion. This endgame does not oust Assad
nor does it destroy ISIS; but it weakens both. The US-Saudi-Turkish coalition
is open to dealing with Russia, but not on Russian terms: the only acceptable
outcome for these allies is the departure of Assad and a Sunni government to
replace him.
The problems with this strategy are many and evident: the
Russians, Syrians and Iranians are not going to sit meekly by while the US and
its allies make their moves. There are many actions short of direct
confrontation that can be taken to counter such an endgame and the other side
is unlikely to be stupid enough to act in the predetermined manner. There will
be countermoves starting with the Baghdad government inviting
the Russians to participate officially in the operations to destroy ISIS in
Iraq. However, the real risk is the high probability of “inadvertent”
incidents—or even really inadvertent incidents—with Russian and American
aircraft operating in the same airspace and possibly bombing targets on
opposite sides of the same battlefield. Once American munitions start killing
embedded Russian troops and vice versa, there will an uncontrollable escalation
risk. Russia will be sure to test the ‘no-fly zone’ which it will declare
illegitimate without Security Council sanction. Either the no-fly stricture is
enforced or it becomes a joke: I tend to think the Russians will be warned
privately that it would be enforced publically.
As 2016 dawns, we may have US and Russian proxies bombing
each other in eastern Ukraine and northern Syria. What’s worse is that we may
face the spectre of doing away with the proxies altogether. Happy new year.