Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, FSA, fighters in the Syrian town of Azez near the border with Turkey. Picture by: Depo Photos/ABACA/ABACA/PA Images. All rights reserved. More than six months after it
was first touted, Turkey has declared the start of an offensive on
Afrin, a Kurdish ‘canton’ held by the People’s Protection Units
(YPG), the main component of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF). Turkish president Erdogan has
announced that the offensive will be an extension of ‘Operation
Euphrates Shield’, a major Turkish backed military campaign
launched in 2016 by a broad coalition of Free Syrian Army (FSA)
factions, aimed at taking territories from ISIS and the YPG/SDF in
the province of Aleppo. Erdogan has also declared that the operation
would extend to the major Arab-majority centre of Manbij, held by the
SDF since 2016 with US
and Russian protection, and the site of brief clashes between the
FSA
and US Special Forces.
However,
it is still yet unclear whether the offensive will extend to the city
of and not merely parts of the canton, and if so, which rebel
factions will join in. Many rebel factions may baulk at the notion of
attacking the city, a heavily-populated Kurdish stronghold, and seek
to limit their advances to Arab-majority towns and villages in the
city’s eastern environs, such as Mennagh and Tel Rifaat, captured
by the SDF from rebels in 2016 under Russian air cover. The
taking of a corridor alongside Tel Rifaat would also link the
Euphrates Shield areas to rebels currently cut off in the western
countryside of Aleppo and Idlib.
Much less is known about the nature of the FSA-SDF conflict in recent years
Whilst
Turkey’s motives for attempting to crush the Kurds is well known –
with Turkey having arguably forced the rebels to surrender the city
of Aleppo as part of an anti-YPG trade off with Russia – much less
is known about the nature of the FSA-SDF conflict in recent years.
Background
The
anger of many rebels towards the YPG should be understood in the
local context of the province of Aleppo. Following their exile by a
heavily-armed ISIS in 2014 (particularly
following the seizure of heavy US weapons stockpiles from the
Iraqi Army in Mosul), the armed brigades and local councils of dozens
of towns and villages in the province of Aleppo were prevented from
returning to liberate their territory from ISIS by US diktat.
Contrary to lax media coverage, the only groups which would receive
US air support against ISIS were those which would explicitly
commit not
to fight the regime, prime amongst them the SDF
(these would commonly referred to as ‘US
backed rebels’, despite the condition not to ‘rebel’).
Here, not only did the US itself refuse
to support the anti-Assad FSA against ISIS – despite the FSA
being the first force on record to have inflicted severe
defeats against ISIS – the US would even
blockade attempts by third parties to support rebel offensives
against ISIS.
Until
the entry of thousands of exiled FSA fighters from Turkey as part of
Operation ‘Euphrates Shield' in 2016, the local revolutionaries of
towns and villages across the province of Aleppo would look on from
exile as the US effectively handed over their territories to the YPG
(later under the banner of the SDF). Within a few months of the
launching of Euphrates Shield, the rebels would liberate
thousands of square kilometres of territory from ISIS and recapture
more than 200 towns and villages.
Post by Omar Sabbour | "US essentially stole vast swathes of Syria," gave it to YPG https://t.co/MRZ9BAVzF7 pic.twitter.com/o9IQfLYgLl
— James Miller (@Millermena) August 15, 2016
Thus,
the reality is that much of the territory controlled by the YPG/SDF
consists of effective theft of territory from the FSA – both directly
under Russian air-cover and indirectly under US air-cover. This is
the source of much of the antipathy between FSA factions and the
YPG/SDF. Furthermore under the subsequent SDF occupation, the new
authorities of areas such as Tel Rifaat and Mennagh reached
‘reconciliation
agreements’ with the regime, whilst expelled residents also
spoke of their dire
circumstances in refugee camps following their by the YPG/SDF.
Other former rebel strongholds taken by the SDF such as Manbij have
since similarly rebelled against SDF rule (indeed in the space of a
few years, Manbij’s revolutionary locals have organised general
strikes against the regime,
ISIS
and the SDF).
General strike in Menbij, east Aleppo, on Sunday 14 January 2018, in protest at the killing of two young men detained by PYD militants who control the city
Manage#سوريا #داعش #قسد #الأسد #عشائر #إضراب #روجآفا #SYRIA #MENBIJ #ALEPPO #ISIS #SDF #PKK #YPG #PYD #ROJAVA pic.twitter.com/MNr4BxX09z
— Northern Syria Observer (@NSO_SY) January 14, 2018
It
goes without saying that an attack on Afrin or its environs (whether
accompanied with abuses or not) will not be portrayed with much
sympathy in western
media, both ‘mainstream’ and ‘alternative’. The YPG is
probably the most popular guerrilla force in the world today,
enjoying widespread backing and sympathy from both western
establishments (not least both the US and Russia) as well as
‘anti-establishment’ social movements (stretching from the
far-right to the far-left).
Yet
the YPG is also a force which has allied
with Assad, allowed US ground forces and military bases on Syrian
territory, called in thousands of US airstrikes (at least one of
which was cited
by the Coalition to result in the Tohar massacre, and which have
killed thousands of civilians overall), returned
territory captured from ISIS to Assad's army, and even proposed
joining
that army in exchange for autonomy. It has supported both Russian
and US airstrikes in Syria even after the heavy cost of civilian
casualties became clearly apparent, and it has repeatedly condemned
rebel criticisms of the civilian casualties by the US-led Coalition
as ‘terrorist
propaganda’, ‘exaggerated’
and ”helping
ISIS”. In what is perhaps a microcosm of its foreign policy, it
has raised the flags of both
Russia
and the US
on its bases to defend itself from the FSA.
Whilst
Human Rights monitors (including allegedly ‘pro-rebel’ sources,
such as the Syrian
Network for Human Rights and the Violation
Documentation Centre) attest that the YPG/SDF may have directly
killed the least amount of Syrians in the conflict – that is, less
than the armed opposition – its alliance with the three greatest
killers of the Syrian people, respectively the Assad regime, Russia
and the United States, is unpalatable. Whilst the longstanding demand
and desperation for Kurdish autonomy is understandable and justified,
and whilst the Syrian opposition is not free from a degree of Arab
chauvinism in its approach towards the Kurds, the YPG has nonetheless
been a model of opportunism in the Syrian war and a principal
proponent of a ‘War on Terror’ paradigm.
Nonetheless,
whilst the fawning attitude towards the YPG in both establishment and
‘anti-establishment’ western
circles may be frustrating, it does not make an attack on Afrin wise.
The
dangers of an offensive on the city
It
should be noted first of all that there has been wider
conflict generally within the Turkish-backed ‘Euphrates Shield’
factions. Last August, a Kurdish commander from the largest Kurdish
FSA faction, Ahfad
Salah al-Din (ASD),
was reported
to have been tortured at the hands of the Levant Front – another
Turkish-backed FSA faction. Whilst both groups were part of the
Euphrates Shield operation against ISIS and the YPG, ASD refused to
be part of an offensive on the city of Afrin and was subsequently
disbanded.
An offensive on Afrin may imperil the rebels in Idlib
The
example set at the time by ASD’s refusal to participate in an
attack on the city of Afrin is a wise one. As well as being a
strategic blunder with potentially vengeful and ominous consequences,
factions which would cross into the city of Afrin would have had
their compass firmly diverted by Turkey away from the much larger
enemy that is the regime. In the vicinity of Afrin, the city of
Aleppo remains occupied by the regime –
whilst an ongoing
regime attempt to capture Idlib, if successful, would constitute
a serious blow to the rebellion.
Indeed,
an offensive on Afrin may imperil the rebels in Idlib. US officials
have long
warned that the presence of Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham (led
by the former Jabhat
al-Nusra) may
entail heavy repercussions for the province (indeed, by some points in the conflict the US has bombed Nusra more than Russia did in the past). However recent
reports being circulated have suggested that the US has countered
Turkish threats by warning that an offensive on Afrin would be met
with an SDF incursion into Idlib – that is, in coordination with
the Assad regime’s ongoing offensive. Thus an attack on Afrin would
not only stretch the manpower available to rebel forces , but may
also invite an increase in US airstrikes on the province, citing the
presence of HTS. Rebels in Idlib may thus find themselves at risk of
being trapped between an SDF attack from the north and an ongoing
regime-ISIS offensive from the south, whilst being subjected to US,
regime and Russian airstrikes.
The
cost of Turkish support for the rebels – motivated of course not by
considerations of anger at the YPG’s collaboration with Assad, but
Turkey’s own conflict with the Kurds – exceeds the potential
damage caused by a rebel offensive on Afrin city, a major popular
stronghold of the YPG. The nationalistic anti-Kurdish motives of the
Turkish forces further risks distorting what is fundamentally a rebel
disagreement with a political party, the PYD (the political arm of
the YPG).
Rebel factions must remember their revolutionary principles which rise high above any temptation of revenge
To
attack a major Kurdish population centre alongside the forces of a
historical adversary is a mistake firstly in terms of principle –
whilst despite it being true that the YPG has aided the regime in
North West Syria, there are far more pressing priorities than the
city of Afrin in terms of practice. Whilst recapturing Aleppo is a
natural aspiration (though it is unlikely that Turkey will allow it),
the entry of the Euphrates Shield factions into Idlib to help fight
the ongoing
regime-ISIS offensive should take precedence before all else.
Otherwise, whilst ES factions are occupied battling on in Afrin, it
may well be good night for Idlib.
Rebel
factions must remember their revolutionary principles which rise high
above any temptation of revenge, regardless of the actions of their
opponents. Ultimately, their opposition to the YPG must first and
foremost be about their relationship with the regime, not fuelled by
Turkish/Arab nationalistic sentiments against ‘separatist Kurds’.