Nariman El-Mofty/AP/Press Association. All rights reserved.Like any fascist regime, Sisi’s
military junta has been predominantly dependent on myths of national pride. Its
inauguration was made possible in 2013 by propagating an ultra-exaggerated,
unrealistic count of anti-Muslim Brotherhood protestors (33 million).
This was followed by media assertions that the Egyptian military had arrested the
commander of the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet and invented a medical device that cures AIDS and Hepatitis C.
The momentum of
‘Egyptian miracles’ propaganda lasted a couple of years, creating an atmosphere
in which anything was permissible as long as it postulated the superiority of
Egyptians and their militarised institutions. Any
contestation or attempt at rational thinking that interrupted this celebratory
momentum was systematically excluded and vilified as an envious plot against
the rising nation.
Today, ‘triumphs’
that had been undebatable and institutions that had been incontestable are now
widely and openly criticised; the AIDS cure is now a running joke. Media
anchors are condemning brutal judicial decisions regarding
children and journalists. These are the same media anchors whose previous guiding ethic was
“jurisdictions cannot be commented on”.
The police are also
being criticised and even the most police-friendly media figures are condemning what they call the “rise of
police-patrol encroachments.” Parliamentarians, governors, and ministers are openly shamed on television. The
whole Egyptian state has suddenly been put under media scrutiny, with few, if
any, 'red lines' respected.
Is it a sudden awakening of media
figures’ consciences? That is unlikely, as the media is monitored by a
multi-levelled hierarchy of state agencies. Even if it was, it would not
sufficiently lead to such a radical change in media messages. There must be a
better explanation for this puzzling phenomenon.
The policy cycle
framework, advanced by Wayne Parsons, hints at an answer. Parsons (1995) argues that for a political product,
like any other product, there is a business cycle.
First, it starts
with a semi-monopoly where alternative products are comparatively outmoded.
Prudent policy makers do their best to prolong this phase through simultaneous
positive branding of the product and downgrading of its alternatives. This
semi-monopoly and its accompanying ‘branding and downgrading’ policy defined
the state of politics throughout most of the two years following the 3 July
coup. The state was branded as successful and any alternatives as absolute evil
and dangerous.
It only gets complicated in the
second phase – the one we are witnessing now. In this phase, Parsons argues,
the political product suffers diseconomies of scale. That is, public demands
are extremely high and meeting them becomes impossible given limited resources.
In this phase, the decline of the political product’s monopoly over public
support inescapable, as is the necessity of prioritising ‘what to give to
whom.’
Parsons' model was
entirely based on democratic institutions, but the product in our case is a
fascist revolution, or the ‘fascist turn’ of the 25 January revolution. The
proposition or product of this fascist regime, that of the mythology of an
invincible nation capable of anything under the guidance of an infallible
state, gained momentum at the beginning, when its ridiculous inventions or
cures were celebrated.
This notion of super
nation set the demands high, but resources were scarce. The second phase of
state-building followed the euphoric honeymoon of post-coup nation-building,
with all attendant questions of distribution.
Given the limited
resources, whose portion was to be supplied was a main concern. The regime’s
distributive policy was quite clear from the beginning: the military, police
and judiciary are placed at the top of the predatory pyramid, followed by
business and media men, then government bureaucrats. The rest of society is fed
nationalistic slogans and mottos, while their basic subsidies and real income
is continuously reduced to compensate for the financial deficits of the
extravagant predatory pyramid.
Defending the predatory pyramid it is no longer the way to appease the state, attacking it has become a necessity.
This distribution
was optimal for Sisi’s regime, but faced two challenges from day one:
First, how can the
lower classes continue to be neglected and entirely excluded from the predatory
pyramid, without risking a bread revolution? The immediate answer lies in the
will and ability of coercive forces (military, police and judiciary) to silence
opposition and reverse any potential for an uprising.
But herein lies the second challenge:
how are they going to keep these coercive forces appeased? Money, fame and
power are key. The first requires investments, which involves appeasing the
business society; the second requires propaganda, which involves appeasing the
media; and the third requires a biased, corrupt bureaucracy, which is only
attainable by allowing government bureaucrats a reasonable portion of the pie.
With oil money
flowing in from the Gulf, Sisi was initially capable of keeping the predatory
pyramid intact. But this tap was unexpectedly
switched off as a result of the crises Saudi Arabia is facing at the moment.
News of Saudi’s cutting off military aid to Lebanon to reinvest in its military
missions in Syria, riots in the east of Saudi and the war it is administering
in Yemen speak volumes on the diffusion of its resources. This combined with
the severe decline in oil prices explains why Egypt cannot expect a blank
cheque from its Saudi allies.
Sisi had had a
mission to complete in return for support from the Gulf: tame the rising Arab
spring before it reached their territories. Whether he managed to placate the
Gulf monarchy or not is debatable, but what is obvious is that the 'Arab
Spring' is no longer the Gulf’s main threat.
The relegation of
Sisi’s 'proxy war' services explains the ultra-generous welcome package he gave
to King Salman on his last visit, which included two of Egypt's islands in the Red Sea.
The drying up of
Gulf support, the failure of the 'new' Suez Canal to generate expected
revenues, the depreciation of the Egyptian pound, murder of Mexican tourists,
crash of the Russian jet and murder of an Italian scholar – and expected international
sanctions to follow – are but a few factors that make catering for the
whole ‘predatory pyramid’ impossible.
The pyramid that had
only excluded the working class had to become more exclusionary. The pie is now
too small for the military, police, judiciary, business, media and bureaucratic
elites to share; and the battle over what remains of Egyptian resources has
become a necessity.
What we see in the
media today is a reflection of this battle. The media has not stepped beyond
the state agenda, but is in fact perfectly implementing it. Since today’s
agenda is to reshape the former predatory pyramid, defending it is no longer
the way to appease the state; attacking it is. This explains why all of a
sudden business and media tycoons, senior bureaucrats (governors,
parliamentarians, etc.), and even judges and policemen are spoken of as public
enemies. It explains why the Egyptian media suddenly seems uncensored.
The
current battle within the press syndicate can be read as an extension of the
same internal struggle between the military-media. One the one hand, a front is
taking it to an extreme against regime brutality, however when the
"regime" is mentioned negatively it is not inclusive of the
president. In fact, Sisi has been asked to interfere and resolve the issue.
What we see in the media today is not
a revolt against the ruling class, but rather a battle within this class. It is
an attempt to redistribute the state’s power and resources, to pave the road
for Sisi’s favoured command: “do not listen
to anyone but me; only me!”
It is not the
beginning of a revolution against a fascist state, as many optimists hope, it is merely the second phase of
fascism.